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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
There

are

whether the

two

issues

provisions of

as amended

in 1982,

presented

Section 35-1-77,

require an

issues involved

his case.

a hearing

Judge of the

to determine the

when an applicant for workers1 compen-

sation benefits files objections
panel in

The first is

Utah Code Annotated,

Administrative Law

Industrial Commission to set and hold
facts and

for review.

to

the

report

of

the medical

The second is whether the amended statute or

the law as it existed at the time the applicant initiated proceedings on

his claims for workers' compensation benefits ought to be

applied •
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
The statute
first

issue

whose

presented

interpretation
for

is

determinative

of the

review is Section 35-1-77, Utah Code

Annotated (1985 Supp.), which reads as follows:
Digitized
by the filing
Howard W. Hunter
Library,
J. Reuben Clark
Law School,
BYU.
Upon
the
ofLaw a
claim
for
compensation
OCR, may contain errors.
*~~ -i«i«-rv Machine-generated
Kv accident,
or for death, arising

out of or in the course of employment, and
where
the
employer or insurance carrier
denies liability, the commission may refer
the medical aspects of the case to a medical
panel appointed by the commission and having
the qualifications generally applicable to
the medical
panel set
forth in Section
35-2-56.
The medical panel shall then make
such study, take such X-rays and perform such
tests,
including
post-mortem
examinations
where authorized by the commission, as it may
determine and thereafter make a report in
writing to the commission in a form prescribed
by the commission, and also make such additional findings as the commission may require.
The commission shall promptly distribute full
copies of the report of the panel to the
applicant, the employer and the insurance
carrier by
registered
mail
with return
receipt requested.
Within fifteen days after
such report is deposited in the United States
post office, the applicant, the employer or
the insurance carrier may
file with the
commission objections
in writing thereto. If
no objections
are so
filed within such
period, the report shall be deemed admitted
in evidence and the commission may base its
finding and decision on the report of the
panel, but shall not be bound by such report
if there is other substantial conflicting
evidence in the case which supports a contrary
finding by the commission.
If objections to
such report are filed the commission may set
the case for hearing to determine the facts
and issues involved, and at such hearing any
party so desiring may request the commission
to have the chairman of the medical panel
present at the hearing for examination and
cross-examination.
For good cause shown the
commission may order other members of the
panel, with or without the chairman, to be
present at the hearing for examination and
cross-examination.
Upon such hearing the
written report of the panel may be received
as an exhibit but shall not be considered as
evidence in the case except as far as it is
sustained by the testimony admitted.
The
expenses of such study and report by the
medical panel and of their appearance before
the commission
shall be paid out of the fund
provided for by section 35-1-68.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter
2 Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

APPLICABLE RULES
In

order

to

prevent

an

arbitrary

granted the Commission in Section 35-1-77,

use

of the discretion

the Commission promul-

gated rules and regulations to govern procedure under the statute.
The

relevant

provision

of

the

Commission's

"Guidelines

For

Utilization of Medical Panel" reads as follows:
A hearing on objections to the panel report
may be scheduled
if there is a proffer of
conflicting medical testimony or an indication
that all relevant medical evidence was not
considered by the panel.
Workers1

Compensation

1.2.33(c).

The Rules

the addendum

Rules

and

and Regulations

Regulations

-

Procedure,

are reproduced

in full in

to this brief, as is Section 35-1-10, Utah Code Ann.

(1953), pursuant to

which

the

Commission

adopts

and publishes

rules and regulations governing procedure before it.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case

arose upon

medical expenses and

appellant Lloyd

compensation

employer, American Coal Company.

Judge

of

the

Industrial

matter in an evidentiary
medical

panel

through 389.)

to

review

The panel found

Moore's industrial

(R.

injury and

off

work

from his

373.)

An Administrative

Commission of Utah considered the

hearing June
the

time

The injury on which he bases his

claims occurred on April 6, 1979.
Law

for

L. Moore's claims for

28, 1984,

and appointed a

medical issues involved.
no medical

(R. 377

connection between Mr.

the medical treatments or time off

work for which he sought compensation,

(R. 398 through 401.)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
3
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Mr.

Moore objected to the panelfs finding, stating that in the opinion
of his treating physicians, the panel's
(R. 404.)
the

In the absence of a proffer of the physicians' opinion,

Administrative

evidence, adopted
claims.

conclusion was incorrect.

(R.

Law

Judge

through

Industrial Commission's
ground that Section

407.)

review

35-1-77,

hearing"

Mr.
of

the

affirmed the

panel

report into

Code

be

held

to

The

Commission denied

Administrative Law

Moore

sought

judge's

Utah

party who objects to the findings of the
through 410.)

the

its findings as his own, and denied Mr. Moore's

405

"medical panel

admitted

order

the

on

the

Annotated, requires a
when

requested

medical panel.
the motion

by

a

(R. 409

for review and

Judge's order.

(R.

414.)

Mr.

Moore then petitioned this Court for review.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant,

Lloyd L.

and twisted his right leg (R.
respondent American

Moore, slipped

on a

16)

the

Coal Company

Moore had injured his right knee
1950's

and,

in

approximately

meniscectomy

on

his

industrial

injury

while

in

right

on April
while
1965,

knee.

1979,

he

June of

in

of the

6, 1979. (R. 1.)
the

military

398.)

underwent

1980, and

employ

in the

Following his

posteromedial recon-

anterior cruciate ligament
arthroscopic debridement of

the lateral joint compartment of the knee in September 1981.
324, 325

and 362.)

Mr.

doctors performed a medial
(R.

struction of the knee in June of 1979,
reconstruction in

in

piece of coal

(R.

The respondent Utah State Insurance Fund, as

American Coal Company's workers'

compensation

insurer,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A

paid the

medical expenses

of the 1979 and 1980 surgeries, and compensation

for temporary total disability from April 6, 1979 through April 5,
1981.

(R. 9.)

When the State Insurance Fund denied liability for

the September 1981 surgery, and terminated compensation, Mr. Moore
filed a

claim with the Industrial Commission and a hearing on the

matter was held November
hearing, a

medical panel

his medical records.
the 1979

and 1981

industrial
medical

23, 1981.

(R.

was appointed

(R. 319-320.)

injury,

but

specifically

physical

1984,

Mr.

right knee, a Coventry
replacement in

to examine Mr. Moore and

The medical panel

therapy

result of the industrial injury.ff
of

Following the

found that

surgeries were all required as a result of the

therapy,

September

10-58.)

Moore

that

"no

further

or surgery is indicated as a
(R.

326.)

In

January and

underwent further surgery on his

osteotomy

September.

stated

in

January

(R. 398-401.)

and

a

total knee

When he presented his

claim for the January surgery to the State Insurance Fund,
denied.

(R.

374-375.)

hearing was held June
were introduced

He

28, 1984,

into evidence.

again

requested

and Mr.

and

records.

again

examined

(R. 392-393.)

Mr.

a hearing.

The

Moore's medical records

(R. 377-389).

Law Judge referred him to a medical panel,
1985,

he was

The Administrative

which met

January 10,

Moore and once more reviewed his

The panel found that the

surgeries which

were performed subsequent to the initial hearing were not necessitated by the industrial
temporarily totally
date

the

panel

had

injury and

that Mr.

Moore had

not been

disabled as a result of that injury since the
previously

found

his

condition

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter
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to

have

stabilized, June

13, 1981.

the medical panel report
the panel

(R. 398-401.)

"for the

reason that

the conclusion of

that the total knee replacement operation was unrelated

to his April, 1979

industrial injury

is, in

treating physicians, clearly incorrect."
The

Mr. Moore objected to

opinions

of

Mr.

Moore's

proffered with his objection,
issued findings

and

the opinion

(R. 404.)

treating physicians were not
the

Administrative

panel as his own.

(R. 405-408.)

the findings

of the medical

Mr. Moore then made a motion for

review of the matter by the Industrial Commission
order was

entered despite

hearing be

appellant

arguing

that

panel and

scheduled."

Commission denied the motion.
"a

"for the reason

the claimant having filed an

objection to findings of the medical
medical panel

Law Judge

of fact, conclusions of law and an order in which

he denied the objections and adopted

that the

of his

(R.

(R. 409.)

414.)

medical

requesting that a
The Industrial

This appeal followed,

panel

hearing is mandatory
i

under Section 35-1-77, Utah

Code

Annotated

filed to a medical panel report."

when

objections are

(Brief of Appellant, p. 3.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

I

I
Section

35-1-77,

Utah

Code

Annotated, as amended in 1982,

provides that the Industrial Commission may set a case for hearing

i

to determine the facts and issues involved when a party objects to
the findings reported by
has referred

a medical

the medical

Commission's discretion

aspects of
to

set

a

panel to

whom the Commission

the case.
case

for

It is within the

wjjat

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
6 OCR, may contain errors.
Machine-generated

is

termed a

*

"medical panel

hearing."

Under the amended Section 35-1-77, the

hearing is not mandatory.
objections

is

The

governed

by

decision

the

to

"Guidelines

set

a

hearing on

for Utilization of

Medical Panel" adopted by the Commission as part of its
regulations governing
hearing be set "if
testimony or

procedure.

there

is

a

The Guidelines
proffer

of

rules and

provide that a

conflicting medical

an indication that all relevant medical evidence was

not considered by the panel."

When neither

indication

Guidelines

described

in

the

the proffer
arise

Commission properly uses its discretion in

in

nor the

a case, the

determining the matter

without setting a medical panel hearing.
II
Remedial statutes

which do

not create new rights or destroy

existing rights are applied retrospectively to
actions.

Marshall v. Industrial Commission of State of Utah, 704

P.2d 581, 582 (Utah 1985).
eliminate,
amended

accrued or pending

or

destroy

section,

setting of

The Administrative
their discretion

existing

rather

a medical
Law

Section

than

35-1-77

rights.
the

section

does

not enlarge,

Therefore,
which

the 1982

required the

panel hearing, applied to Mr. Moore's case.
Judge

and according

and

the

Commission

acted within

to established rules of procedure

in ruling on the case.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
SECTION 35-1-77, UTAH CODE ANN. (SUPP. 1985),
LEAVES THE DECISION TO SET OBJECTIONS TO
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter
7 Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

MEDICAL PANEL REPORTS FOR HEARING WITHIN THE
COMMISSIONS DISCRETION; THEREFORE, THE FACT
THAT
THE
COMMISSION
AFFIRMED
THE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S DECISION WITHOUT
FURTHER HEARING ON THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT
ENTITLE THE APPELLANT TO REVERSAL OF THE
COMMISSION'S DECISION.
Section 35-1-77,
to be followed by
filing

by

employer

an
or

employee's

Utah Code

the

Industrial

employee
its

of

insurance

claim.

Ann., sets

It

a

Commission

claim

carrier

provides

for
denies

that

study the

medical aspects; that
parties, who

case and

a

the

make a

report

of

Utah

liability
medical

of the

for

the

panel may be
case; that the

report in writing on its

shall

be

distributed

to the

are given fifteen days within which to object to the

report; and, that if there are no objections, the report
deemed

upon the

compensation when the

appointed to determine the medical aspects
panel shall

forth the procedures

admitted

in

evidence.

The

sixth

shall be

sentence of Section

35-1-77 contains the material which is pertinent to this appeal:
1

If objections to such report are filed the
commission may set the case for hearing to
determine the facts and issues involved, and
at such hearing any party so desiring may
request the commission
to have the chairman
of the medical panel present at the hearing
for examination and cross-examination,
(Emphasis added.)

Prior

to 1982,

the sixth

(

sentence of Section

35-1-77 read as it appears in appellant's brief:
i

If objections to such report are filed it
shall be the duty of the commission
to set
the case for hearing within thirty days to
determine the facts and issues involved . . .
In 1982, the legislature amended
35-1-77, substituting

the

"the commission

sixth

sentence

may11 for

of Section

"it shall be the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter
8 Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

duty

of

the

commission

published guidelines
follow to

The Commission then adopted and

which it

and its

Administrative Law Judges

determine whether or not to set a hearing on objections

in a given case.
Judge

to."

Therefore,

considered

Mr.

at the

Moore's

time the

objections to the findings of the

medical panel, in February and March
discretion to

Administrative Law

of 1984,

it was

within his

set the case for further hearing or make a decision

based on the evidence

before him.

The

Administrative Law Judge

analyzed the

case in accordance with the Commission's guidelines,

and

no

finding

indication that

proffer

of

conflicting

all relevant

medical

attempts to

Mr. Moore's objections.

rely on the language of the unamended

version of Section 35-1-77,
wrought by

or

medical evidence was not considered

by the panel, he did not set a hearing on
Mr. Moore

testimony

making

no

reference

to

the change

the 1982 amendment, and basing his argument that he is

entitled to

reversal of

the Industrial

Commission's decision on

Johnson v. Moore Business Forms, 694 P.2d 597 (Utah 1984), Schmidt
v. Industrial Commission^ 617 P.2d 693 (Utah 1980),

and Lipman v.

Industrial Commission,

Each of these

592 P.2d

616 (Utah

1969).

cases dealt with

the issue whether convening a medical

mandatory

under

statutes

which

refer" or "shall

appoint"

a

Schmidt ruled
the

Workers1

mandatory

medical panels
Compensation

under

Disease Disability

Section
Law.

contained

medical

the

panel.

mandatory under
Act.

Johnson

35-2-56(2)
Mr.

Moore

of

panel was

language "shall
Both

Lipman and

Section 35-1-77 of
held

medical panels

the Utah Occupational

argues

that

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
9
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just

as the

appointment of a medical panel was found mandatory in these cases,
setting a medical panel hearing
panel report

is also

when

mandatory.

objection

is

made

to the

However, in Johnson, the Court

noted that in 1982 the legislature amended Section 35-1-77 to make
convening of

a medical

footnote 1.

panel discretionary •

694

The legislature substituted "may" for

P.2d 597, 599
"shall" in the

first sentence

of Section 35-1-77, which deals with referral to a

medical panel.

According to the Court in

"effectively reversed

Johnson, this amendment

Schmidt" on the issue whether referral to a

medical panel is mandatory under the section*
The substitution of "may" for "shall"
of Section

35-1-77 gave

a medical panel.
be

the

duty

the

commission

to"

upon

objections

by the

in

to

the
The

for "it shall

the sixth sentence of

whether

within the Commission's discretion.
is governed

first sentence

So too, the substitution of "may"

of

hearing

in the

the Commission the discretion to convene

Section 35-1-77 leaves the decision
further

Id.

to

set

a

medical

case for

panel report

Commission's discretion

"Guidelines for Utilization of Medical Panel"

adopted by the Commission.

The

"Guidelines" read,

in pertinent

part:
A hearing on objections to the panel report
may be scheduled
if there is a proffer of
conflicting medical testimony or an indication
that all relevant medical evidence was not
considered by the panel.
Workers1
1.2.33(c).

Compensation
Mr.

Moore

Rules
is

not

and

Regulations

"entitled"

to

a

i
Procedure,

hearing

on

objections, nor is he "entitled" to have the Commission's decision
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter
10 Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

reversed, as

he argues

in his

brief*

The Commission's decision

complied fully with the law.

There was not a proffer of conflict-

ing

was

medical

testimony

nor

there

an

indication

relevant medical evidence was not considered by the
case*

The

records

of

Mr*

Moore's

treating

that all

panel in this
physicians were

introduced as evidence at his hearing and forwarded

to the panel.

In light of these facts, the Commission's decision cannot be said
to be arbitrary, capricious, wholly without cause, or
the one

inevitable conclusion

supported

by

the

medical panels.

evidence

It was

from the
and

made in

the

evidence.
reports

of

contrary to
Rather, it is
two qualified

accordance with the statute, and

in accordance with the rules adopted by the

Commission to prevent

any abuse of the discretion Section 35-1-77 allows.

It should not

be displaced on review.
POINT II
THE 1982 AMENDMENT TO
THE PROVISIONS OF
SECTION 35-1-77 PERTINENT TO THIS CASE IS
PROCEDURAL IN NATURE
AND
APPLIES RETROSPECTIVELY TO
CLAIMS SUCH AS APPELLANT'S
WHICH ACCRUED OR WERE PENDING PRIOR TO THE
TIME OF THE AMENDMENT.
Mr.

Moore's

Section 35-1-77,
thinks the

brief
which

does
fact

unamended Section,

not mention the 1982 amendments to
leads

to

found in

Utah Code Annotated, controls his case.
ascribes the

the

that he

the bound 1953 volume of
The

injury to

which he

need for his 1984 medical treatment occurred in 1979

and the Industrial Commission first reviewed
it in 1981.

assumption

claims stemming from

The argument that the law in effect at the initiation

11

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of proceedings

is the law that controls throughout

the State and the Department of
State,

Dept.

of

Social

1 9 8 2 ) . There, the State
of its

complaint

certain

employee

initiated

administrative
either the

contested

grievances

v.
the

filed

procedures

their

action

review

State or

administrative

Services

Higgs. 656 P.2d

998 (Utah

district court's

dismissal

of

in

defendants.

provided

employees'

following

the

for

grievances

the

fifth

statute

grievance

establish a sixth level of administrative
board.

and dismissed
to exhaust

the State's complaint, ruling

this Court analyzed

and

authorized

remedies.

review of the

the

which was a

administrative

was

amended

review before

The district court applied

its administrative

five-step

step

proceedings,

the

the amended

the State

to

a person-

had

statute
failed

The State appealed, and

its arguments on appeal as follows:

The State argues that
the
law
in effect at
the time
the legal
proceedings are initiated
controls all
the proceedings
from that point
forward.
It
relies for that proposition on
Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Trustees. Inc. ,
8 Utah
2d 101, 329 P.2d 398 (1958); McCarrev
v. Utah State
Teachers' Retirement
Bd.» 111
Utah
251, 177 P.2d
725
(1947);
and In re
Ingraham's Estate, 106 Utah 337, 148 P.2d 340
(1944).
These
authorities
state
the
well-established
rule
that
statutory enactments
which
affect
substantive
or
vested
rights generally
operate
only prospectively.
Under the
cases cited, the substantive law to
be applied throughout an action is
the law in
effect at
the date
the action was initiated.
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The

a

seek judicial

During

however,

sustaining

effect at the time the defend-

had

employeeCs) to

decision

by

hearing before a state hearing officer.

nel review

likewise made in

for review of an administrative order

statutory grievance
ants

Social Services

a case is one
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State v. Carney, 163 Ohio St. 159, 126 N.E.2d
449 (1955). Since the State had the right of
judicial review upon completion of Step 5
under the law in effect at the initiation of
the administrative
proceedings, the State
asserts that it may not be deprived of that
right by a subsequent change in the law.
656 P.2d 998, 1000.

The Court's response to this argument was:

However, procedural
statutes enacted subsequent to the initiation of a suit which do
not enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or
contractual rights apply not only to future
actions, but also to accrued and pending
actions as well . . . .
Generally, new
procedural rules do not affect proceedings
completed prior to enactment • • • .
Further
proceedings in a pending case are governed by
the new law • • • •
656 P.2d, 998, 1001
case

the

statute

(citations omitted.)
outlining

resolving Mr. Moore's claims
and proceedings

the

procedures

was amended

on his claims.

As

in Higgs.
to

in this

be followed in

during the

pendency of

The amendments to Section 35-1-77

did not enlarge, eliminate or destroy

any vested

right or change

the substantive law of the Workers' Compensation Act.

Mr. Moore's

rights to potential recovery of medical

payment for

time off

work have

expenses and

not been diminished or altered.

ings before the Industrial Commission on his claims
by the

new law

and neither

The proceedwere governed

the Administrative Law Judge nor the

Commission was required to set or hold a hearing on his objections
to the medical panel report.

CONCLUSION
Section 35-1-77

of the

Workers' Compensation Act, Utah Code

Annotated (1985 Supp.), was amended in 1982 to make the setting of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
13
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

a

medical

panel

hearing

only the established

discretionary.

procedure

for

The amendment, varying

review

of

workers 1 claims,

operated in furtherance of a remedy which already existed.

It did

not create new

of the

rights

appellant herein.

or

As

destroy

the

existing

rights

the Court stated in Marshall v. Industrial

Commission of State of Utah, 704 P.2d 581 (Utah 1985),
This Court has consistently held that in
worker's
compensation
cases the benefits
to be awarded to an injured worker are to be
determined on the basis of the law as it
existed at the time of the injury.
As the
Court said in Oakland Construction Co. v.
Industrial Commission: "[A] later statute or
amendment should not be applied in a retroactive manner to deprive a party of his
rights or impose greater liability upon him."
We recognize that this rule differs from the
general rule followed
in this jurisdiction
which is that "the substantive law to be
applied throughout an action is the law in
effect at the date the action was initiated."
(Emphasis added.)
A contrary rule to both of the above applies,
however, to statutes which operate in furtherance of a remedy already existing and which
neither create new rights nor destroy existing
rights.
Those remedial statutes are applied
retrospectively to accrued or pending actions
to further the legislature's remedial purpose
unless
a
contrary
legislative intent is
manifested .
704 P.2d 581, 582 (emphasis added.)
Therefore, on February 6,
objected to

the report

had been referred, the
his case
It

was

did not
within

of the

when

the

appellant herein

medical panel to which his claims

Administrative

have a
his

1985,

Law

Judge

presiding over

duty to set his objections for hearing.

discretion,

as

controlled
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by

established

guidelines, to 'set a

hearing on objections.

conflicting medical testimony or
medical evidence

Absent a proffer of

an indication

that all relevant

had not been considered by the panel, he adopted

the findings of the medical panel report as his own and denied Mr.
Moore f s

claims.

On

review

of

his

decision,

the Industrial

Commission adopted his findings of fact and conclusions
affirming

his

denial.

On

review,

Commission's discretion, pursuant to

it

was

also

of law in
within

amended Section

the

35-1-77, to

set the matter for further hearing.
On review

by this Court, the Commission's findings should be

displaced only if they
cause,

contrary

to

are arbitrary,
the

evidence, or without any

one

capricious, wholly without

inevitable

substantial

conclusion

evidence

to

from

the

support them.

Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888, 890 (Utah 1981).

In

this

or

case,

the

capricious but

Commission's
within its

were based on the

findings

were

discretion under

evidence accumulated

not

arbitrary

Section 35-1-77, and

during two

hearings, the

findings of two qualified, duly appointed medical panels, together
with records from

all

of

the

appellant's

treating physicians.

Given these facts and the controlling authorities cited above, the
Commission's findings should be affirmed.
DATED thia~>N (' day of January, 1986.
BLACK & MOORE

_J^/
James R. Black
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WORKERS1 COMPENSATION
RULES AND REGULATIONS - PROCEDURE
Adopted in Accordance with the Provisions of 35-1-10 and 35-2-5.
All changes herein effective 8/17/84.
1.1.1.

DEFINITIONS:

(a)

"Commission" - means the Industrial Commission
of Utah.

(b)

"Applicant/Plaintiff"
means an injured
employee or his/her dependents or any person
seeking relief or claiming benefits under the
Workers1
Compensation
and/or Occupational
Disease and Disability Laws.

(c)

"Defendant" - means employers and includes
insurance carriers and self insured, and the
Second Injury Fund.

(d)

"Administrative Law Judge" - means a person
duly designated by the Industrial Commission
to hear and determine disputed or other cases
under the provisions of Title 35, Chapters 1
and 2.

(e)

"Insurance Carrier" - includes all insurance
companies writing Workers1 Compensation and
Occupational Disease and Disability Insurance,
the State Insurance Fund and Self Insurers
who are granted self-insuring privileges by
the Industrial Commission*
In all cases
involving
no
insurance
coverage by the
employer,
the
term
"Insurance
Carrier"
includes the employer.

1.2.33.

(a)

GUIDELINES
to Section
following
submitting

FOR UTILIZATION OF MEDICAL PANEL - Pursuant
35-1-77, U.C.A. the Commission adopts the
guidelines
in determining
the necessity of
a case to a medical panel:

A panel will be utilized where:
1.

One or more significant
are involved.

medical issues

Generally a significant medical issue
must be shown by conflicting medical
reports. The issues of permanent partial
impairment will be considered significant
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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if conflicting medical reports vary with
a rating more than 5% of the whole
person; or if the temporary total cut
off date varies more than 90 days; or if
the amount of medical expense in controversy is more than $2,000.
2.

In the opinion of the Commission the
medical
issues
are
so
intertwined
with the events that a determination of
whether an accident has occurred cannot
be made without first resolving medical
consideration.

(b)

Where in
the opinion of the Commission, the
evidence is insufficient for the Commission to make
a final determination, the Commission may require
an independent medical evaluation*
Costs to be
assessed against the employer and/or Second Injury
Fund.

(c)

A hearing on objections to the panel report may be
scheduled if there is a proffer of conflicting
medical testimony
or an
indication that all
relevant medical evidence was not considered by
the panel.

(d)

The Commission may authorize an injured worker to
be examined by another physician for the purpose
of obtaining a further medical examination or
evaluation
pertaining
to
the medical issues
involved, and to obtain a report addressing these
medical issues in all cases where:

10.

1.

The treating physician has failed
refused to give an impairment rating.

or

2.

The employer or doctor considers the
claim to be non-industrial.

3.

A substantial injustice may occur without
such further evaluation.

RULES FOR PROCEDURE:
Subject to the provisions of this title, the
Commission
shall
adopt and publish rules and
regulations governing procedure before it, and
shall prescribe forms of notices and manner of
serving the same in all claims for compensation,
and may change the same from time to time in its
19
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35-1-10
(cont.)

discretion. Such rules and regulations shall
include provisions
for procedures
in the
nature of conferences in order to dispose of
cases
informally,
or to expedite claims
adjudication, narrow issues and simplify the
methods of proof at hearings.

20
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JOHNSON v. MOORE BUSINESS FORMS

Utah 597

Cite ax 694 ?2d 597 (Utah 1984)

amount necessary to accomplish that objective as specifically directed by the judgment, the plaintiffs themselves had the
work done after the entry of the trial
court's decree. The defendant objected to
plaintiffs* actions when he filed the motion
to amend the judgment. No relief was
granted.
The trial court's order was clear and
snequivocal; the defendant was entitled to
a money payment from the plaintiff so that
the grading could be accomplished in a
reasonable manner according to the directions of the defendant and not as the
plaintiffs saw fit to do; Since the work
was done after the conclusion of the trial,
the record is devoid of the nature and extent of the work performed by the plaintiffs. Accordingly, we remand this case to
the trial court for a determination of what
amount, if any, is owed by plaintiffs to the
defendant for the purpose of having the
defendant's parcel graded in a manner that
s in reasonable conformity with the intent
and purpose of the decree if it is not now.
The decree of partition is affirmed; the
case is remanded for further proceedings in
accordance with this opinion. No costs.
HALL, C.J., and HOWE, DURHAM and
ZIMMERMAN, JJ.f concur.
KEY NUM81R SYSTEM

$

Linda B. JOHNSON, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v,
MOORE BUSINESS FORMS, INA/Aetna
and the Industrial Commission of Utah,
Defendants and Respondents.
No. 19630.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Dec- 3, 11)84.
Employee brought partial disability
daim under occupational disease disability

law. The administrative law judge dismissed claim, and the Industrial Commission affirmed. The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held that administrative law
judge was required to call medical panel to
decide extent and causation of any disability upon claimant's assertion that repeated
trauma on job caused tenosynovitis.
Reversed and remanded.

1. Workers' Compensation <®=>1730
Employee's claim, under the occupational disease disability law, of permanent
partial disability caused by tenosynovitis of
the wrist required that medical panel be
called by administrative law judge to determine extent and causation of any disability,
where employee asserted, through her testimony and letter from her doctor, that
repeated trauma of twisting motion required by her job caused tenosynovitis.
U.C.A.1953, 35-2-1 to 35-2-65, 35-2-27(25).
2. Workers' Compensation <3=>547
Employee claiming partial disability
under occupational disease disability law
was not required to show identifiable accident as prerequisite to recovery; such
showing is only required for claims under
Workers' Compensation Act. U.C.A.1953,
35-1-1 et seq., 35-2-1 et seq.

Arthur F. Sandack, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff and appellant.
Gilbert Martinez, Shaun Howell, Robert
Shaughnessy, Frank V. Nelson, Asst. Attys.
Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendants and
respondents.
ZIMMERMAN, Justice.
The issue in this review from the Industrial Commission is whether an administrative law judge can dispose of a claim of
permanent partial disability under the Utah
Occupational Disease Disability Law without calling a medical panel.
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Mrs. Johnson, an employee of Moore
Business Forms in Logan, Utah, brought
this partial disability claim under the Utah
Occupational Disease Disability Law (the
"Act"). Utah Code Ann., 1953, § 35-2-1 to
-2-65 (1974 ed. & Supp.1983). She alleged
that her assembly line job caused her to
suffer tenosynovitis of the left wrist, resulting in permanent partial disability.
Her job consisted of wrapping and packing
paper forms and involved repetitive twisting motions with both her hands. The administrative law judge heard evidence of
the work she did and the motions and
stresses to which her hands and wrists
were subjected. The judge rejected her
claim* finding that Mrs. Johnson had not
shown that her tenosynovitis was "due to
continual pressure or friction or to repeated trauma or vibration of tools," as
required by section 35-2-27(25) of the Act.
The Commission affirmed. Because that
finding was made without first convening a
medical panel as required by section 35-256(2) of the Act, we reverse.
Sections 35-2-27(25) and 35-2-56(1) of
the Act provide that one suffering from
tenosynovitis of the wrist "due to continual
pressure or friction or repeated trauma or
vibration of tools" resulting in permanent
partial disability is entitled to compensation
if that condition is "caused or contributed
to" by an occupational disease or injury to
health. Mrs. Johnson made exactly this
claim. The Act requires that when such a
claim is filed with the Commission, "the
commission shall appoint an impartial
medical panel . . . , and such medical panel
shall make such study, take such X-rays
and perform such tests as the panel may
determine...." Utah Code Ann., 1953,
§ 35-2-56(2) (Supp.1983) (emphasis added).
Following such study, the panel must report to the Commission both (i) the extent
of any permanent partial disability and (ii)
whether the disability, in whole or in part,
resulted from an occupational disease. Id.
Despite the clear requirement of the statute that upon the mere filing of such a
claim a medical panel "shall" be convened,
the administrative law judge took it upon

himself to hold a hearing, consider the evidence, including the supportive medical
opinion of Mrs. Johnson's doctor, and make
findings of fact and conclusions of law that
Mrs. Johnson's tenosynovitis did not result
from any of the causes enumerated in section 35-2-27(25), including "friction" or
"repeated trauma." He then dismissed her
claim.
[1] The administrative law judge
seemed to be operating under the unspoken
premise that not every claim filed that alleges the statutory elements requires convening a medical panel; only those cases
that pass some threshold test of meritoriousness established by the administrative
law judge may go forward. That interpretation of the statute is contrary to the plain
language of section 35-2-56(2) and, furthermore, is flatly contrary to this Court's
holdings in Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 617 P.2d 693, 695-96 (1980),
and Lipman v. Industrial
Commission,
Utah, 592 P.2d 616, 618 (1979). In those
cases, we ruled that similar language in the
Workers' Compensation Act required the
convening of a medical panel in all cases.
Utah Code Ann., 1953, § 35-1-77 (1974 ed.).
The instant case presents an even more
compelling reason than existed in Schmidt
for applying the statute literally. Section
35-2-56(2) of the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law includes language describing the legislature's purpose in requiring that all questions of causation and disability raised by a claim be referred to a
medical panel, language that was absent
from the parallel section of the Workers'
Compensation Act construed in Schmidt
In section 35-2-56(2) the legislature specifically found that these questions present
"highly technical" issues and that the "difficult task" of dealing with these issues
"should be placed in the hands of physicians specially trained for the care and
treatment of the occupational disease involved." Given this legislative finding, we
are not free to depart from the interpretation placed upon the similar language in
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STATE v. GEHR1NG
Cite as 694 P.2d 599 (Utah 1984)

Schmidt, despite the fact that the legislature later amended the Workers' Compensation Act to delete the requirement that a
medical panel be convened in every case.1

B evh

sdical
make
rthat
•esult
i seci" o r '
dher
judge
poken
at alJ concases
ritorirathre
erpres plain
., fur*
ourt's
Com*
1980),
ssion.
those
in the
id the
cases.
4 edX

?***•

12] The administrative law judge invaded the province of the medical panel when,
without input from a panel, he found that
Mrs. Johnson's job did not involve the statutorily required pressure, friction, trauma,
cr vibration.2
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In the present case, Mrs. Johnson's claim
met the required statutory minimum to
trigger the convening of a medical panel.
Section 35-2-27(25) of the Act requires that
to be compensable tenosynovitis of the
wrist must be caused, inter alia, by job-rehted continual "friction" or "repeated trauma." Mrs. Johnson claimed that job-related repeated trauma caused tenosynovitis of
ber wrist. She testified about the repetitive twisting wrist movements required by
ber job and produced a letter from her
doctor, Dr. Hyde, opining that the requirements of her job played a causative role in
her wrist problems. Once she made this
showing, a medical panel had to be called
» report on whether the continual twisting
motions required by Mrs. Johnson's job
constituted "friction" or "repeated trauma"
and whether this trauma eventually resulted in her tenosynovitis.

V;
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Y:\
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We reverse the administrative law
pige's holding and remand for further
proceedings before a properly called medical panel.

*

HALL, C.J., and STEWART, HOWE and
DURHAM, JJ., concur.
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L In 1982, the legislature amended section 35-177 to make convening of a medical panel discretionary under the Workers' Compensation Act.
1932 Utah Laws ch. 41 § 1. This amendment
effectively reversed Schmidt on this issue.
However, it is worth noting that no such change
•*as made in the similar language used in section 35-2-52(2) of the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law, perhaps because the legislature thought the latter act required more sophisticated determinations, best made only with expert assistance.

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Stanley LeRoy GEHRING, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 19790.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Dec. 3, 1984.

Defendant was convicted of rape in the
Second District Court, Davis County, Douglas L. Cornaby, J., and defendant appealed.
The Supreme Court, Howe, J., held that:
(1) evidence was sufficient to support conviction; (2) trial court's failure to order
production of bed on which rape allegedly
occurred did not prejudice defendant; and
(3) unavailability of witness did not entitle
defendant to new trial.
Affirmed.

1. Criminal Law <3=>1159.2(6)
Supreme Court will sustain criminal
conviction when there is any evidence, including reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from it, from which findings of all
requisite elements of crime can be reasonably made.
2. Rape ®=>1
Emission of semen is not necessary to
the crime of rape. U.C.A.1953, 76-5407(3).
2.

In his findings, the administrative law judge
also stressed the fact that nothing unusual or
accidental in nature had occurred on the day
Mrs. Johnson first reported pain. That fact is
irrelevant. It is only when the injury complained of does not lit under the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law and is dealt with
under the Workers' Compensation Act that theclaimant must show an identifiable accident as
a prerequisite to recovery. See Pintar v. Industrial Commission, 14 Utah 2d 276, 277, 382 P.2d
414 (1963).
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SCHMIDT v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
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693

Cite as, Utah, 617 P.2d 693

Douglas L. SCHMIDT, Plaintiff,
The INDUSTRIAL COMIVIISSION OF
UTAH, Kenway Engineering, Inc., and
Industrial Indemnity, Defendants.
No. 16097.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 8, 1980.
Injured worker appealed from an order
of the Industrial Commission which denied
his application for disability compensation.
The Supreme Court, Maughan, J., held that:
(1) administrative law judge erred in concluding that no "accident" occurred for
which claimant could be granted compensation; (2) referral of medical aspects of the
case to medical panel was mandatory; and
(3) evidence was erroneously excluded on
basis of hearsay rule.
Reversed and remanded.
Stewart, J., concurred in the result.
Wilkins, J., filed concurring opinion.
Crockett, C. J., filed dissenting opinion
in which Hall, J., joined.
1. Workers* Compensation c=>517
Claimant's internal failure brought
about by exertion in the course of employment could be "accident" within meaning of
workmen's compensation statute, without
requirement that the injury result from
some incident which happened suddenly and
was identifiable at definite time and place.
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
2. Workers' Compensation c=>568
Injury received by employee may be
accidental even though exertion is that required in ordinary course of employment.
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
3. Workers' Compensation c=»568
If employee incurs unexpected injuries,
including internal failures, caused by ordi-

nary duties of his employment, he is eligible
for compensation. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
4. Workers' Compensation @=>597
Workmen's compensation statute requires existence of causal connection between injury and employment. U.C.A.1953,
35-1-45.
5. Workers' Compensation <*»1730
When accidental injury has occurred,
submission to medical panel of medical aspects of the case, including those involving
causation, is mandatory. U.C.A.1953, 3 5 - 1 77.
6. Workers' Compensation <3=>1385
Hearsay rule has no application in proceeding before Industrial Commission;
Commission and its hearing officers may
receive and consider any hearsay evidence
presented to it. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-88.
7. Workers' Compensation <§=>1385
Administrative law judge erred in excluding certain evidence presented in workmen's compensation proceeding on basis of
hearsay rule. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-88.

Jay A. Meservy of Verhaaren & Meservy,
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen. and Floyd
G. Astin, Asst. Atty. Gen., K. Allan Zabel,
Stewart L. Poelman, Salt Lake City, for
defendants.
MAUGHAN, Justice:
The plaintiff, Douglas L. Schmidt, appeals from an order of the Industrial Commission denying his application for disability compensation. We reverse the order and
remand the matter to the Commission for
further proceedings. All statutory references are to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended.
Douglas L. Schmidt began working for
the defendant, Kenway Engineering, Inc.,
October 25, 1976, as a rough-cut sawman.
His principal employment duty was the cutting of steel to various sizes for use in the
shop. The steel pieces he was required to
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memorandum in support of his motion for
handle varied in weight from a few ounces review, the Industrial Commission denied
to as much as 200 pounds. While an overhead
head crane
crane was
was present
present in
in the
the shop
shop its
its use
use the plaintiff's motion and affirmed the acby other employees rendered
tions of the administrative law judge,
t
1 it
U unavailable
.tMovnilahlp
to the plaintiff at various times. When the
T h e issues presented on appeai concern
crane was unavailable the demands of the t h e a d m i n istrative law judge's conclusion
position required the plaintiff to move the n o .. a c c i d e n t » ^ ^ ^ for which the plainheavy pieces alone or with the aid of fellow t i f f c o u l d b e
^ compensation( failure
employees. The plaintiff testified at the o f l h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l a w j u d g e to r e f e r t h e
Commission Hearing it was a common oc- m e d i c a l a s p e c t s o f t h e c a s e t o a m e d i c a l
currence in carrying the larger pieces for
x a n d t h e e x d u s i o n of c e r U i n e v i d e n c e
one of the individuals involved to suddenly
^ b the laintiff at t h e heari
drop the piece. This would result in the r
other person absorbing the shock of the f Concerning the first issue, the plaintiff
™otal
i canaiaiy
candidly W|JUHUVU
explained Yprior ._to and at the hearmetal hitting
hitting the
the floor.
floor
ing HP
he could not pinpoint any specific time
^nor
The plaintiff, a 21 year old male, had a
or occurrence as the origin of his present
prior history of back disorders. As an adoback problems. The judge explained in his
lescent he had contracted Scheurmann's disease, which resulted in severe pain in his findings of facU
"The application did not specify a date
back involving the Til, T12 and LI verteon
which an accident occurred but rebrae. This osteochrondrosis was juvenile in
ferred
only to February, 1977, and the
nature and the plaintiff testified that from
applicant
described the accident by stata year to a year and a half prior to his
ing:
'Under
the stress of lifting steel
accepting employment at Kenway Engidaily
I
developed
accute low back pain/ "
neering he experienced no difficulties or
However,
at
the
hearing
the plaintiff reproblems with his back.
However, by February 1977, the plaintiff counted an incident occurring in mid-Dewas having significant problems with his cember, in which he slipped while handling
back. He testified initial soreness began in a piece of steel and struck his knee on the
December of 1976, increased gradually in saw table. Although the blow was allegedintensity and duration through January and ly very painful, the plaintiff testified, beinto February. He then went to a doctor cause he did not want to create a negative
for care. X-rays taken at that time impression on his employer, he did not reshowed a spondylolysis in the lower lumbar port it. A short time later he hit the same
region and a possible appendicolith. Fol- knee on a piece of scrap metal protruding
lowing additional x-rays confirming the ex- from a waste can and reported that incident
istence of the appendicolith the plaintiff to his supervisor.
\UK plaintiff
yum.v.*. also
— stated generally the
underwent an appendectomy. After recovThe
ery from the appendectomy the plaintiff above-mentioned problem with the hanreturned to work. By June of 1977, he was dling of the steel but could not identify a
i n s t a n t «^
again experiencing significant pain in his SpeCUlC
specific instance
as v.adverselyv affecting his
eA(K;i !i;iivatt£ « .
back. While the back pains the plaintiff
back. He was seen by three different medi- complained of in February, 1977, allegedly
cal doctors, these consultations culminated originated contemporaneously with the slipin a laminectomy and fusion of L5 SI level ping incident the plaintiff introduced no
vertebrae on July 19, 1977.
direct proof he experienced or realized any
The plaintiffs application for workmen's specific damage to his back because of that
compensation benefits was denied. Follow- incident.
ing a hearing the administrative law judge
Section 35-1-45 provides compensation
entered findings of fact, conclusions of law
for industrial accidents when the employee:
and an order denying the benefits request"is injured . . .
by accident arising
ed. After the plaintiff's submission of a
&
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out or or in the course of his employment,
wheresoever such injury occurred, provided
the same was not purposely self-inflicted."
The administrative law judge concluded the
plaintiff was not entitled to compensation,
because he failed to establish he sustained
an injury as a result of an identifiable
accident or accidents. Quoting from Pintar
v. Industrial Commission* the judge explained:
"It is therefore, a prerequisite for compensation that his disability be shown to
result, not as a gradual development because of the nature or condition of his
work, but from an identifiable accident or
accidents in the course of the employment."
[1] In this jurisdiction, it is settled beyond question an internal failure brought
about by exertion in the course of employment may be an accident within the meaning of 35-1-45, without the requirement
that the injury result from some incident
which happened suddenly and is identifiable
at a definite time and place.2 As this Court
explained in Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial
Commission:3
"In Cherdron Construction Co. v. Simpkins, 61 Utah 493, 214 P. 593, 596, this
court held that '[t]he underlying principle
seems to be that the injury must happen
suddenly, undesigned and unexpected,
and at a definite time and place.' In the
Dee Hospital [v. Ind. Comm., 109 Utah 25,
163 P.2d 331] case we have relaxed the
requirement that it be sudden and at a
definite time and place so that the essential requirement now seems to be that it
be unexpected and not designed."
1. Pintar v. Industrial Commission, 14 Utah 2d
276,382 P.2d414 (1963).
2. Jones v. California Packing Co.. 121 Utah
612, 616, 244 P.2d 640, 642 (1952); see also
Robertson v. Industrial Comm., 109 Utah 25,
163 P.2d 331 (1945); Thomas D. Dee Memorial
Hospital Assoc, v. Industrial Comm., 104 Utah
61, 138 P.2d 233 (1943); Hammond v. Industrial Comm., 84 Utah 67, 34 P.2d 687 (1934).
3. Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Commission.
115 Utah 1, 17, 201 P.2d 961. 969 (1949).

[2, 3] It is equally well settled the injury
received may be accidental even though the
exertion* is that required in the ordinary
course of employment.4 If an employee
incurs unexpected injuries, including internal failures, caused by the ordinary duties
of his employment he is eligible for compensation under 35-1-45.5 Therefore, the administrative law judges conclusion of law
was erroneous and did not reflect our contemporary standard.
[4] The existence of an unexpected inju-v
ry, however, is the beginning rather than
the end of the Commission's inquiry. This
Court's interpretation of 35-1-45 requires
the existence of a causal connection between the injury and the employment./
Justice Wade explained this requirement in
Purity Biscuit:$
lt
.
in a case of this kind where
the employee suffers an internal bodily
failure or breakdown the burden is on the
applicant to show that the exertion was
at least a contributing cause thereof. In
other words, . . .
in cases where
disease or internal failure causes or is the
injury there must be a causal connection
between the employment and the injury."
Many times the determination of the existence of a causal connection between the
injury and the employment will depend on
the production and interpretation of medical evidence. To establish agency expertise
in this area the legislature enacted 35-1-77.
This section provides:
"Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by accident, or for
death, arising out of or in the course of
5. Justice Wolfe explained in his dissenting
opinion in Robertson, supra note 2, 163 P.2d at
338: "Thus where exertion or overexertion in
the course of the employment causes disability
or death, I agree that compensation should be
allowed."
6. Purity Biscuit, supra note 3, 201 P.2d at 969;
see also M & K Corp. v. Industrial Comm., 112
Utah 488, 189 P.2d 132 (1948); Robertson v.
Industrial Comm., supra note 2; Andreason v.
Industrial Comm.. 98 Utah 551. 100 P.2d 202
(1940).

4. Id., 201 P.2d at 969.
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employment, and where the employer or
insurance carrier denies liability, the commission shall refer the medical aspects of
the case to a medical panel
. . ."
[5] This statute mandates the submission of the medical aspects of the case to
the medical panel.7 In the present case, as
in most cases involving internal injury, the
determination of the existence of the requisite causal connection depends in part on
the accumulation and interpretation of
medical evidence. The language of the
statute is clear. When an accidental injury,
such as in the present case, has occurred the
submission of the medical aspects of the
case, including those involving causation, is
mandatory.
At the hearing, the administrative law
judge excluded certain evidence presented
by the plaintiff because it was hearsay and
thus inadmissible. Section 35-1-88 states:
"Neither the commission nor its hearing officers shall be bound by the usual
common-law or statutory rules of evi. dence."
[6, 7] The hearsay rule has no application in a commission proceeding and the
commission and its hearing officers may
receive and consider any hearsay evidence
presented to it.8 Therefore the administrative law judge erred in excluding this evidence on the basis of the hearsay rule.
Because the present injury is of a type
held by this Court to fall within the purview of Section 35-1 45, the administrative
law judge's conclusion that no accident occurred should not be reached from the facts
presented, without submission of the matter
to the medical panel. The case is remanded
to the Commission for further proceedings.
Those proceedings shall include the submis7.

Lipnum v. Industrial
GIG. 618 (1979).

8.

See Ogden Iron Works v. Industrial
102 Utah 492. 132 P.2d 376 (1942).

1.

IB Larson at 7 4. citing inter alia. Residential
& Commercial Construction Company v. Industrial Commission. Utah, 529 P.2d 427 (1974).

2.

See. e. g.. Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 (1949);

sion of the medical aspects of this problem
to a medical panel.
WILKINS, Justice (concurring):
I concur that this matter should be remanded and the medical aspects referred to
a medical panel. Because, however, of conflicting case law in this State interpreting
the statutory requirement that to support
an award of compensation a worker must
be injured "by accident," I deem it appropriate to enlarge on the analysis of this
point found in the main opinion with a view
to providing the Industrial Commission
with a consistent standard to apply.
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Crockett centers on the necessity of
identifying "an accident" which causes injury. As Professor Arthur Larson (hereafter
"Larson") points out in his treatise, The
Law of Workmen's Compensation (1980),
"[t]he basic and indispensable ingredient of
'accident' is unexpectedness".1 This Court
has recognized as much in past cases.2 Larson continues:
A second ingredient, however, has been
added in most jurisdictions: The injury
must be traceable, within reasonable limits, to a definite time, place, and occasion
or cause. Justification of this widespread
addition is not entirely clear. When the
phrase "accidental injury" is used, or the
equivalent phrase "injury by accident,"
there is no occasion, as a matter of grammar, to read the phrase as if it referred
"an accident," and then proceed to conduct a search for "the accident".3 (emphasis in original)
The main opinion makes it clear that in
Utah "accident" connotes an unlooked for
mishap which is not expected or designed.4

Comm., Utah, 592 P.2d

Comm.,

Residential & Commercial Construction
pany v. Industrial Commission, supra.
3.
4.

Com-

1B Larson at 7 5.
This is the language of the first English case
interpreting the English workmen's compensation act which was adopted in 1897, Fvnton v.
Ihorley & 0».. 11903) A.C. 443. Pcnton ha*
often been cited in Utah cases including Purity
Biscuit.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

SCHMIDT v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
•obiem

be rered to
f conreting
pport
must
pprof
this
view
ission

Utah

697

Otc as, Utah, 817 P.2d 693

• M9*t?

JusLy o f

injuafter
The
980).
ntof
Jourt
Lar*

Mr. Chief Justice Crockett also expresses
concern that without the requirement of
identifying an accident in compensation
cases, "[t]he practical effect would be to
make the employer a general insurer of the
health and well-being of his employees".
In my view, protection against unwarranted
awards for internal failure is not to be
found in requiring identification of an accident. Rather protection against such
awards is found in requiring a medically
demonstrated causal connection between
the injury and the employment. With the
issue being one primarily of causation, the
importance of the statutorily mandated
medical panel becomes manifest. It is
through the expertise of the medical panel
that the Commission should be able to make
the determination of whether the injury
sustained by a claimant is causally connected or contributed to by the claimant's employment.
There is no reason to expect that application of the standards laid down in this case
will render employers the insurers of the
health of their employees. Rather there is
every reason to expect that the beneficent
and humanitarian purposes of the worker's
compensation act will be effectuated.

been
jury
limision
read
the
the

STEWART, J., concurs in result.

nC

CROCKETT, Chief Justice (dissenting):

amrred
con)ha-

The foundational rules upon which this
Court should review the Commission's ruling are: that it is the Commission's prerogative to judge the evidence, and if there is
any reasonable basis therein to justify the
Commission's finding, this Court should not
disturb it.1 Conversely stated and specifically applicable here: when the Commission
has refused to find a work-connected accident, this Court should not reverse and direct such a finding unless the evidence is so
clear and persuasive that all reasonable
minds acting fairly thereon must necessarily so find.2

: in
for

ed.4

rase
lsai v.
has
ritv

1. Kent v. lnd. Comm.. 89 Utah 381. 57 P.2d 724.

Bearing in mind those rules, the salient
antr what should be the controlling proposition here is that the Commission was not
persuaded that the plaintiff had met his
burden of proving that he suffered an accident arising out of or in the course of his
employment.
The position taken in this dissent does not
disagree with the proposition that even
though an employee has a preexisting abnormal condition, if it is aggravated into a
compensable injury or disability by an accident which arises out of or occurs in the
course of his employment, as required by
the statute, it is compensable. Nor do I
question that if there is some extraordinary
exertion or stress which produces an occurrence which the Commission finds to come
within the definition of accident, it can be
found compensable.3
The point of disagreement with the main
opinion is its statement that ".
it is
settled beyond question that an internal
failure brought about by exertion in the
course of employment may be an accident
within the meaning of Sec. 35-1-45, without the requirement that the injury result
from some incident which happened suddenly and is identifiable at a definite time and
place."
It is submitted that that statement is not
justified by the cases cited in support thereof; and I doubt that any such case can be
found. On the contrary, the statement is
squarely inconsistent with the applicable
statute, and with all of the case law on the
subject with which I am acquainted.
The first place to test the soundness of
the proposition just stated is the applicable
statute. In my judgment, Sec. 35-1-45,
U.C.A.1953, leaves no room for doubt or
misunderstanding. It states plainly and
simply that compensation is to be paid
when the employee "is injured
by accident arising out of or in the course
of his employment." There similarly should
be no misunderstanding or confusion on the
proposition that the term "accident" im3. Graybar Electric Co. v. lnd. Comm., 73 Utah
568, 276 P. 161.

2, Id.; and see Vause v. lnd. Comm., 17 Utah 2d
217, 407 P.2d 1006.

fe
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ports that there must be some unanticipated event or occurrence, different from what
would normally be expected to occur in the
usual course of events.4 It is submitted
that a study of the numerous cases decided
by this Court on the subject, and other
authorities as well, will reveal that without
exception, they have been concerned with
whether there was in fact some incident or
occurrence which would come within the
definition of accident, as is expressly required by the statute. 5
Controversies of this character are so
common that such cases are found in practically every volume of the Utah Reporter;
and it would serve no useful purpose to
burden this page with excessive citations.
In the interest of brevity, it is sufficient to
say that on the point of controversy herein,
the cases are all of generally similar import.
It seems fair to assume that the plaintiff
(and the main opinion) would select those
cases which would best give support for its
thesis quoted above, and upon which its
reversal of the Commission's order necessarily must rest.
The case of Robertson v. Ind. Comm.f on
which the main opinion places reliance is as
good an example as any. In that case, the
burden of the main opinion was to demonstrate that there was an extraordinary exertion in manipulating and skinning an extra large horse, so that the heart seizure
would come within the definition of such an
unexpected occurrence and thus could be
found to be an accident. I join in the main
opinion's approval of Justice Wolfe's reasoning and statement of the law in his
dissent in that case. He stated the standard rule of review, which if applied to this
case would affirm the Commission, that:
"Unless the evidence is such as to compel
the conclusion that the Commission was ar4.

Tintic Milling Co. v. Ind. Comm., GO Utah 14,
206 P. 278; Carlinp v. Ind. Conmi.. 10 Utah 2d
260. 399 P.2d 202.

5.

Tintic Milling und Mining Co. v. Ind. Comm.,
60 Utah at 22. 206 P. at 2K1 states:
If the injury is incurred uradually in the
course of the employment, and because
thereof, and there is no specific event or
occurrence known as the starting point, it is

bitrary in failing to find that the internal
failure was service-connccted, we should
not set aside its decision/'7 And upon the
basis of his previously made explanation
that it was the prerogative of the Commission to find the facts, he dissented from the
reversal of the Commission's decision.
Another good example of the principle
involved is our recent case of IGA Food
Fair v. Martin} There, the applicant was
undergoing unusual exertion in unloading a
shipment of heavy boxes of meat and, because of the extraordinary stress, suffered a
heart attack. The same comment is to be
made about Jones v, Ind. Comm.* in which
the extraordinary stress was from being
required to repeatedly crank a balky motor
over a long 16-hour double shift.
It is important to realize that the removal
of the requirement that there be some
event which can be regarded as an accident
arising out of or occurring in the course of
employment, so that it need only appear
that some injury or disability developed
which could be related to the employee's
work, would be a dramatic change in our
law. The practical effect would be to make
the employer a general insurer of that aspect of the health and well-being of his
employees. This might be of temporary
benefit to a few individuals in the labor
force who may have some infirmity. But I
think if we take a second look, such a rule
would do them more harm than good in the
long run.
The forcing of employers to become, in
practical effect, such general insurers of
employees would add to the already plentiful burdens of going into or carrying on
enterprises, which furnish jobs for others,
and would thus reduce opportunities for
employment. More especially, with respect
held to be an occupational disease, and not
an injury resulting from accident.
6.

109 Utah 25. 163 P.2d 331.

7.

Id. at 47. 163 P.2d at 341.

8.

Utah, 584 P.2d 828.

9.

121 Utah 612. 244 P.2d 640.
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to persons who already have some infirmity,
there would be even more adverse effect
because economic necessity would force employers to give more searching examinations, and refuse to hire anyone with any
history or indication of physical disability or
handicap. I acknowledge that the proposition just stated should be considered by this
Court only if it thinks it has the prerogative
of making a dramatic change in policy and
the law. It is my view that the Court has
no such prerogative; and that the proper
procedure for the long term benefit of employers, employees and the public generally
is to follow the statute as it is written, and
the adjudications thereon; and if there is to
be any such dramatic change in the law, it
should be done by the legislature. Then,
everyone will know of that change in the
law, when it takes effect, and how to govern themselves in accord therewith.
There is no question here, but that the
plaintiff suffered from a pre-existing difficulty with his back, for which he had previously, received medical treatment and which
had existed at least since he was in junior
high school, eight or nine years prior to this
claim. As the main opinion itself fairly and
properly points out, the plaintiff himself
stated unequivocally that he could not identify any specific time or occurrence in his
work as the origin of the disability in his
back.
In response to various questions concerning whether there was any incident or occurrence from which the applicant's back
problem resulted, he repeatedly stated that
there was not. Typical of these answers is:
Q. Mr. Schmidt, isn't it true that you
really cannot relate the onset on your
back pain to any particular event
that occurred while you were working for Kenway?
A. That's true. (R., p. 37)
On the basis of the whole evidence, the
findings of the administrative law judge,
adopted by the Commission, states:
that the applicant has simply
not met his burden of proving that an
accident occurred which caused the injury
complained of. We further note that

there are no witnesses, no timely reporting and no showing of a relationship between the injury and the work of the
applicant.
In regard to the question of reference to
a medical panel: Plaintiff cites Sec. 35-177, which requires the Commission to refer
"the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel
.." As is true of all statutes, this one should be given a sensible and
practical application. First, assume a hypothetical case in which the evidence was so
absolutely clear that no one could disagree
that the applicant had suffered no accident
in the course of his employment. Would it
yet be maintained that merely because he
had filed an application for benefits and the
employer had denied liability, the Commission was nevertheless compelled to refer the
case to a medical panel. It seems idle to
have to answer such a question, but the
answer, of course, is no. The same reasoning applies here. Inasmuch as the findings
and order of the Commission rest upon the
proposition that considering the whole evidence, and particularly the plaintiffs own
testimony, there was no basis upon which to
find that there was a work-caused or connected accident, there would be no useful
purpose to be served by referring the nonexistent medical aspects of the case to a
medical panel.
Because there is no basis upon which it
can be concluded that the action of the
Commission was capricious, arbitrary or unreasonable, I would affirm its decision.
HALL, Justice (dissenting):
I join in the dissent of Mr. Chief Justice
Crockett which I deem reflects the accurate
state of the law in Utah. Particularly is
this so in light of the most recent pronouncement of this Court in Farmers Grain
v. Mason, Utah, 606 P.2d 237 (1980).
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that the court should have granted a mistrial?
[1-4] In the first place it appears that
the matter was not properly and timely
brought to the attention of the trial court.
The objection made was that it called for a
legal conclusion. Then defendant's counsel
suggested that Mr. Whiteley be handed a
copy of the decision. After the matter had
been thoroughly discussed, counsel for defendant then indicated a desire to make a
motion out of the presence of the jury. The
court suggested that he make it at recess
and he agreed to do so.
During the next recess defense counsel
did move for a mistrial and during the
argument following the motion he stated:
MR. LIVINGSTON: Your Honor,
maybe so that we could work this out I
would be amenable if the Court rather
than ruling on the motion for a mistrial,
if the Court would give a Jury instruction
to the effect that that was a misstatement of law as to whether Mr. Whiteley
was convicted of fraud, and that that is
not relevant in this case and not to be
considered in this case by the Jury in
their deliberations as to what the agreement was between the parties and who is
going to pay for the attorney's fees.
The court denied the motion for a mistrial and gave the following instruction to
the jury:
Any evidence or inference which may
have been made in this courtroom that
Mr. Whiteley was named personally in
the case of Robcrston v. Gcis, et al, is
incorrect as Mr. Whiteley was not a party
to that lawsuit and you should disregard
any such inferences or evidence.
The granting of a motion for a mistrial
lies in the sound discretion of the trial
judge and his ruling should be overturned
only when it clearly appears that he has
abused his discretion. A mistrial should be
2. Curley v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corporation, 314 Mass. 31, 49 N.F..2U 445 (1943).

granted only when it appears that justice
will be thwarted unless the jury is discharged and a new trial granted.2
The trial court did not abuse its discretion
in refusing to grant a mistrial under the
circumstances of this case.
[5, 6] However, the court in calculating
the amount of the judgment, compounded
the interest annually on the unpaid
amounts due. This is not proper. Compound interest is not favored by the law.3
The plaintiff relies upon the case of Jensen v. Lichtenstcin* as authority for permitting compound interest. That case is
not in point. There the defendant promised
to pay interest at specified times and this
Court held that when the specified date
arrived there was a new debt, to wit, the
promised interest, in addition to the original
debt. In the instant matter there was no
promise to pay interest at a particular time.
The judgment is affirmed except as to
the interest and as to that matter the case
is remanded to the trial court with directions to recalculate the interest at simple
interest rate.
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L. Virginia LIPMAN, widow of Paul
Lipman, Deceased, Plaintiff,
v.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Utah,
Utah State Prison, and State
Insurance Fund, Defendants.
No. 15821.
Supreme Court of Utah.
March 12, 1979.
Workmen's compensation benefits were
denied by the Industrial Commission, and
4. 45 Utah 320, 145 P. 1036 (1915).

3. Goodwin v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
196 Wash. 391, 83 P.2d 231 (1938); Musser v.
Murphy, 49 Idaho 141, 286 P. 618 (1930).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

that
had
by <
stan
in n
355
Mai
E
Mc*

I
I
Ma
K
2,

LIPMAN v. INDUS! UAL COMMISSION
Cite as 5S

claimant sought review. The Supreme
Court, Hall, J., held that: (1) Commission's
refusal to refer to medical panel question
whether death from myocardial infarction
was causally related to circumstances occurring on job was prejudicial and required
reversal, and (2) Commission erred in stating that applicant had burden of proving
causal relationship by clear and convincing
evidence; proper standard was usual standard of proof used in most civil actions.
Order of Commission vacated and set
aside, and matter remanded.
1. Workers* Compensation c=» 1730
When liability is denied, applicant for
workmen's compensation has clear right to
have case referred to medical panel appointed by Industrial Commission, and statute so providing is mandatory. U.C.A.1953,
£5-1-77.
2. Workers* Compensation o=»1730, 1937
Industrial Commission's refusal to refer
to medical panel question whether death
from myocardial infarction was causally related to circumstances occurring on job was
prejudicial and required reversal. U.C.A.
1953, 35-1-77.
3. Workers' Compensation o=»1413
Industrial Commission erred in stating
that applicant for workmen's compensation
had burden of proving causal relationship
by clear and convincing evidence; proper
standard was usual standard of proof used
in most civil actions. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45,
35-1-77, 35-1-83.
Scott W. Cameron, of Backman, Clark &
Marsh, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Robert D.
Moore, Salt Lake City, for defendant.
HALL, Justice:
Paul Lipman, husband of petitioner, died
May 23, 1977, as a result of an acute myo1. U.C.A., 1953, 35 1 45.
2. U.C.A., 1953, 35-1-83.
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cardial infarction while on duty as the control room sergeant at the Utah State Prison. The Industrial Commission denied benefits to the petitioner because it found that
her husband did not die as a result of an
accident arising out of or in the course of
his employment.1 This matter was then
brought before this Court for review.2
The evidence before the Commission
showed that the deceased had suffered one
(and possibly two) heart attacks prior to his
death. He suffered from an arteriosclerotic
heart condition and had undergone corrective surgery the previous autumn for a perforal heart condition. In November 1976 he
suffered an almost fatal episode of pulmonary edema while on vacation. As a result
of his condition he was permitted to work
only part time until approximately two
months before his death. He was diabetic
and had been a lifelong smoker of tobacco.
His treating physician testified that a person with the medical and social history of
the deceased had a high probability of being
subject to a myocardial infarction and that
this probability was not conditioned upon
any unusual stress or exertion.
The petitioner claims that decedent's
death was caused by the extra work and
stress brought on by the "escape" of a
female inmate. The woman was housed at
the Y.W.C.A. in Salt Lake City which functioned as a half-way house for the prison
where low-risk inmates were given certain
community privileges as a step toward ultimate release. The woman was discovered
to be missing at 11:55 p. m. on May 22,
1977, which has reported to one Connie
Buck, a supervisory counselor at the facility, some 25 minutes later. Ms. Buck contacted Mr. Lipman at the prison and the
Y.W.C.A. director, whereupon the inmate
was designated an escapee. Mr. Lipman
was responsible for coordinating all information regarding the escape. He learned
of the escape at about 12:40 a. m. on May
23, 1977,3 and until his death, some two
3. The testimony is conflicting as to precisely
when the escape occurred. The Commission's
finding that the escape occurred at 11:55 a. m.
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hours later, he had more phone calls than he
otherwise would have handled.
We do not reach the ultimate issue as to
whether or not the death was job related
because the resolution of two procedural
points raised by petitioner are dispositive of
this review. The two points are: (1) that
the Commission refused to refer this matter
to a medical panel as provided by law, and
(2) that the Commission applied an improper standard as to the burden of persuasion.

death was caused by a myocardial infarction, but the ultimate question is whether
or not it can be said that the myocardial
infarction was causally related to circumstances occurring on the job.5

Findings of a medical panel may well be
important in assisting the Commission to
determine whether job-caused stress induced injury or death in such a manner as
to be compensable. The petitioner in this
case should not be deprived of an important
[1] When liability is denied, an appli- procedural provision in the Workmen's
cant for Workmen's Compensation is af- Compensation Act. This is particularly so
forded a clear right to have the case re- here since petitioner's procedural rights are
ferred to a medical penal appointed by the. closely akin to her substantive rights.
Commission. The applicable statute reads
[3] Turning now to the issue raised as to
in pertinent part as follows:
the
quantum of evidence necessary to prove
Upon the filing of a claim for compencompensability, the Commission slated that
sation for injury by accident, or for
the petitioner had the burden of proving by
death, arising out of or in the course of
clear and convincing evidence that the
employment, and where the employer or
death of the deceased was caused by tension
insurance carrier denies liability, the comand stress of his employment. This Court
mission shall refer the medical aspects of
has consistently held that the burden of
the case to a medical panel appointed by
proof in Workmen's Compensation cases is
the commission
The medical
proof by a preponderance of the evidence.6
panel shall make such study, take such
It appears that the only Utah case which
X-rays and perform such tests, including
makes reference to any other standard of
post mortem examinations where authoproof is Thomas D. Dec Memorial r. Indusrized by the commission, as it may detertrial Commission,1 and that reference was
mine and thereafter shall make a report
clearly dictum. The standard of "clear and
in writing to the commission
. ,4
convincing" evidence has not been adopted
The foregoing statute is clearly mandato- by this Court. To adopt such a standard in
ry and requires that a medical panel "shall" a case of this nature would make recovery
be convened "upon the filing of a claim for for death caused by internal failure excepcompensation for injury by accident, or for tionally difficult especially where the dedeath, arising out of or in the course of ceased had a pre-existing condition that
employment/' when the employer or insur- may have contributed to the death. Appliance carrier denies liability.
cation of the usual standard of proof which
[2] In difficult or doubtful cases, the is used in most civil actions better accomfindings of a medical panel may assist in modates the liberal purposes of the act and
determining whether the death was caused the type of proof that is likely to be availa8
by accident. In this case, it is known that ble in most cases of this type. Utilization
(some twelve hours before Lipmnn learned of
it) appears to be erroneous.
4.

Henderson v. Industrial Commission, 80 Utah
316, 15 P.2d 302 (1932); Wilson v. Industrial
Commission, 99 Utah 524, 108 P.2d 519 (1940).

U.C.A., 1953, 35-1-77.

5.

M & K Corporation v. Industrial Comm., 112
Utah 488, 189 P.2c! 132 (1918).

6.

Grasteit v. Industrial Commission, 76 Utah
487, 2Q0 P. 764 (1930); Higley v. Industrial
Commission, 75 Utah 361, 285 P. 306 (1930);

7.
8.

104 Utah 61. 138 P.2d 233 (1943).
See Askren v. Industrial
Commission, 15
Utah 2d 275, 391 P.2d 302 (1964).
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of that standard by the Commission in this
case, combined with the refusal to make a
referral to a medical panel, denied the
plaintiffs right to have the claim evaluated
in the manner contemplated by the statute.

and are in possession of real property to
bring action for sale in lieu of partition, sole
life tenant, by himself, does not have right
to force sale in lieu of partition. U.C.A.
1953, 78-39-1.

The order of the Commission is vacated
and set aside and the matter is remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. Costs awarded to petitioner.

2. Partition O=>19
One vested remainderman cannot compel sale in lieu of partition under statute
permitting one or more of several cotenants
who hold interest in and are in possession of
real property to bring action for sale in lieu
of partition, where there is no possessory
interest in the vested remainderman. U.C.
A.1953, 78 39 1.

CROCKETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN,
WILKINS and STEWART, JJ. t concur.

Sandra D. FUNK and Robert A. Young,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
;••••

. v .

William R. YOUNG, Defendant
and Respondent.
No. 15937.
Supreme Court of Utah.
March 12, 1979.
Life tenant and vested remainderman
appealed from order of the Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, David K. Winder,
J., dismissing petition for sale in lieu of
partition. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J.,
held that petition failed to state claim under statute permitting one or more of several cotenants who hold interest in and are
in possession of real property to bring action for sale in lieu of partition, where the
life tenant was sole life tenant and remainderman was not in possession.
Affirmed.
1. Partition c=>14
Under statute permitting one or more
of several cotenants who hold interest in
I.

3. Partition c=*M, 19
Petition of life tenant and one vested
remainderman failed to state claim under
statute permitting one or more of several
cotenants who hold interest in and are in
possession of real property to bring action
for sale in lieu of partition, where the life
tenant was sole life tenant and remainderman was not in possession. U.C.A.1953,
78-39-1.
David Lloyd of Watkins & Fairer, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Franklin D. Anderson, Salt Lake City, for
defendant and respondent.
STEWART, Justice:
The parties in this case are two brothers
and a sister who inherited a house from
their mother. Robert A. Young, a plaintiff,
inherited a life estate interest in the house
subject to his personally residing there and
subject to an obligation to repair and maintain the premises and to pay the utilities,
taxes and special assessments. The other
plaintiff, Sandra D. Funk, and the defendant, William R. Young, were devised the
remainder fee estate as co-tenants. Sandra
D. Funk and Robert A. Young brought an
action in the District Court seeking an order directing the sale of the property and
an apportionment of the proceeds under our
partition statute, Section 78-39-1, U.C.A.1
The District Court dismissed the action for

U.C.A. refers to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
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ment of Employment Security ("department'*) for unemployment benefits. The
department found that plaintiff was entitled to weekly benefits for a period of ten
weeks, but reduced his benefits by 100% of
the amounts which he was then receiving as
retirement benefits, pursuant to U.C.A.,
1953, § 35-4-3(b). This reduced plaintiffs
unemployment benefits to zero.
Plaintiff began receiving payments from
the Federal Civil Service Retirement System on or about January 27, 1980. The
payments received by plaintiff from said
Retirement System are not subject to federal income tax to the extent they are considered a return of plaintiffs contribution
to his retirement fund, under applicable
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.
At the department, plaintiff submitted
proof that his receipts from the Civil Service Retirement System would not be taxable until July 15, 1981. U.C.A., 1953,
§ 35-4-3(b) provides, in part:
[T]he "weekly benefit amount" of an individual who is receiving, or who is eligible to receive, retirement benefits by reason of his past performance of personal
services shall be the "weekly benefit
amount" which is computed pursuant to
this section less 50% until April 1,1980, at
which time the deduction for retirement
income shall be 100% (disregarding any
fraction of $1) of his primary benefits
which are attributable to a week.
In seeking a reversal of the decision of
the department, plaintiff argues that his
retirement benefits did not begin until July
15, 1981, and that until that time, plaintiff
received only a return of his capital, which
was neither "wages" nor new income.
On this basis, he contends that until July
15, 1981, he received only those amounts
which he had been forced to save. He
points out that other savings accounts are
not deductible from unemployment benefits, and the statute requiring reduction of
his unemployment benefits by the amounts
received monthly from these savings, while
disregarding other savings, constitutes discrimination and a denial of equal protection
in violation of the Utah and U.S. Constitutions.

This Court has previously considered
plaintiffs arguments and has found them
to be without merit. Coleman v. Department of Employment Security, 29 Utah 2d
326, 509 P.2d 355 (1973). Unemployment
compensation is designed to alleviate hardship to an employee and his family due to
involuntary layoffs where the employee has
no other means of meeting his expenses of
living. In the same manner, retirement
benefits enable the employee to meet these
expenses.
Plaintiffs argument that his receipts are
not income or wages is not persuasive. The
statute does not speak in terms of wage or
income receipts; rather, "retirement benefits" which are "received by reason of his
past performance of personal services" are
deductible under Section 35-4-3(b). The
monthly payments payable to plaintiff from
the Civil Service Retirement System meet
this description, and are thus deductible
from unemployment compensation under
our statute.
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The STATE of Utah, DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES, Plaintiff
and Appellant,

•f"*
-•

4. Ac

v;

Roger C. HIGGS, Kurt Mathia, and
George C. Melis, Defendants and
Respondents.
No. 17607.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 26, 1982.

Appeal was taken from order of the
Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Kenneth Rigtrup, J., which dismissed
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State's petition for review of Step 5 grievance ruling. The Supreme Court, Stewart,
J., held that: (1) where Personnel Management Act which removed right of State to
seek judicial review of Step 5 proceeding
had been adopted while the grievance was
pending, District Court did not have jurisdiction, but (2) order dismissing should allow State to pursue its new right to a Step
6 proceeding.
Affirmed as modified.
1. Statutes «=» 267(2)
Procedural statutes enacted subsequent
to the initiation of a suit which do not
enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or contractual rights apply not only to future
actions but also to accrued and pending
actions as well; new procedural rules do not
affect proceedings completed prior to enactment.
2. Statutes <s=>270
When the purpose of an amendment is
to clarify the meaning of an earlier enactment, the amendment may be applied retroactively in pending actions.
3. Labor Relations s=>477
Where statute providing State with a
right to judicial review of grievance proceeding after a Step 5 determination was
repealed prior to completion of those procedures, State's complaint in the district court
did not validly invoke the jurisdiction of the
district court.
4. Administrative Law and Procedure
^229
Administrative remedies must first be
exhausted before resort may be had to judicial review.
5. Courts <s=>23
Parties may not by stipulation enlarge
the jurisdiction of a court beyond the
boundaries delimited by statutory or constitutional law.
6. Labor Relations <s=M12
Personnel Management Act did not affect any common-law or vested rights of
State or employee who had filed grievance

and would be applied in case which was
pending in the grievance procedure at the
time of the adoption of the Act. U.C.A.
1953, 67-19-20 to 67-19-25.
7. Labor Relations <s=>486
Where State had improperly attempted
to obtain judicial review of Step 5 grievance ruling even though the Personnel
Management Act had been adopted which
created a Step 6 procedure for the State to
use, order dismissing State's petition for
review in the court would allow for State to
file a Step 6 proceeding.

Don R. Petersen, Provo, for plaintiff and
appellant.
Kathryn Collard, Salt Lake City, for defendants and respondents.
STEWART, Justice:
The State of Utah, on behalf of the Department of Social Services, filed a complaint in the district court June 7, 1980,
seeking judicial review of an administrative
order sustaining in part employee grievances filed by the defendants against the
Department. On July 22, 1980, the district
court dismissed the complaint because the
State had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. The State appeals that order, contending that the trial court erred in
not applying the procedural provisions of
the statute in effect at the time defendants
first initiated their grievance procedures
rather than different procedural provisions
enacted subsequent to the initiation of the
administrative proceedings.
The Department's objection to various
conduct by the defendants led to the defendants' initiation of employee grievance
proceedings under the State Employees'
Grievance Procedure Act, U.C.A., 1953,
§§ 67-17-1 to -6 (repealed by 1979 Utah
Laws, ch. 139, § 36). That Act provided
state employees with a five-step grievance
procedure which consisted of: (1) an oral
discussion with the grievant's immediate supervisor; (2) a written appeal to the grievant's immediate supervisor; (3) a written
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appeal to the grievant's second level supervisor; (4) a written appeal to and hearing
before the grievant's department head; and
(5) a written appeal to and hearing before a
state hearing officer. The Act authorized
judicial review of the administrative decision by the district court upon petition by
either the employee or the State at the
conclusion of the Step 5 procedure. § 6717-6(5).
After the first four steps had been completed and a Step 5 hearing had been scheduled but not yet held, the Grievance Procedure Act was repealed, 1979 Utah Laws, ch.
139, § 36, and replaced by the Utah State
Personnel Management Act, U.C.A., 1953,
§§ 67-19-20 to -25 (1981 Supp.), which established a sixth level of administrative review before a personnel review board. Under the Personnel Management Act as originally enacted, only an employee, not the
State, was accorded the right to appeal to
the personnel review board from the Step 5
proceeding; either the employee or the
state agency could seek judicial review of
the new Step 6 proceeding. 1979 Utah
Laws, ch. 139, § 31.
Upon completion of the Step 5 procedure
in this case, the hearing officer denied four
and sustained five of the nine employee
grievances. The Department sought judicial review of that decision in the district
court pursuant to the repealed Grievance
Procedure Act, which was in effect at the
commencement of the administrative proceedings. At the same time, the employees
petitioned for a Step 6 administrative review pursuant to § 67-19-25(6) of the new
Personnel Management Act on those issues
on which they had lost.
The district court, on the employees' motion to dismiss, ruled that the State had not
exhausted its remedies and that no substantive right of the Department would be prejudiced by completion of the administrative
process. The court therefore remanded the
matter for further administrative proceedings, and the State filed an appeal from
that order to this Court. While the appeal
was pending, but before the case was
briefed and argued, the Legislature again

changed the grievance procedures, amending the Personnel Management Act to allow
either the agency or aggrieved employees to
obtain a Step 6 review, and to allow judicial
review of a Step 6 order only to the aggrieved employee and not to the state agency.
The central issue in this case is what law
governs the procedural rights of the parties: the Grievance Procedure Act which
was in effect at the commencement of the
action; the Personnel Management Act
which was enacted after the action was
commenced but before the petition for judicial review was filed; or the amendment to
that act which was passed while the case,/
was pending before this Court.
The State argues that the law in effect at
the time the legal proceedings are initiated
controls all the proceedings from that point
forward. It relies for that proposition on
Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Trustees, Inc.,
8 Utah 2d 101, 329 P.2d 398 (1958); McCarrey v. Utah State Teachers' Retirement Bd.t
111 Utah 251, 177 P.2d 725 (1947); and In
re Ingraham's Estate, 106 Utah 337, 148
P.2d 340 (1944). These authorities state the
well-established rule that statutory enactments which affect substantive or vested
rights generally operate only prospectively.
Under the cases cited, the substantive law
to be applied throughout an action is the
law in effect at the date the action was
initiated. State v. Carney, 163 Ohio St. 159,
126 N.E.2d 449 (1955). Since the State had
the right of judicial review upon completion
of Step 5 under the law in effect at the
initiation of the administrative proceedings,
the State asserts that it may not be deprived of that right by a subsequent change
in the law.
[1,2] However, procedural statutes enacted subsequent to the initiation of a suit
which do not enlarge, eliminate, or destroy
vested or contractual rights apply not only
to future actions, but also to accrued and
pending actions as well. Petty v. Clark, 113
Utah 205, 192 P.2d 589 (1948); Boucofski v.
Jacobscn, 36 Utah 165, 104 P. 117 (1909); 82
C.J.S., Statutes, § 416 (1953). Generally,
new procedural rules do not affect proceed-
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ings completed prior to enactment. Drainage District No. 7 of Washington County v.
Bernards, 89 Or. 531, 174 P. 1167 (1918).
Further proceedings in a pending case are
governed by the new law. St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co. v. Robinson, 228 Ark.
418, 308 S.W.2d 282 (1957); Cleveland Trust
-Co. v. Eaton, 21 Ohio St.2d 129, 256 N.E.2d
198 (1970); Drainage District No. 7 of
Washington County v. Bernards, supra.
^However, when the purpose of an amendment is to clarify the meaning of an earlier
enactment, the amendment may be applied
y retroactively in pending actions. McGuirc
v. University of Utah Medical Center, Utah,
' 603 P.2d 786 (1979); Foil v. Ballingcr, Utah,
601 P.2d 144 (1979); Okland Construction
Co. v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 520
\ P.2d 208 (1974).
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judicial review of an Industrial Commission
order. The district court's affirmance of
the Commission's order was reversed on appeal to this Court and remanded to the
district court. The defendants moved to
dismiss, asserting that the district court
lacked jurisdiction because of an amendment, which became effective prior to the
remand, transferring jurisdiction for judicial review of Commission orders from the
district court to the Supreme Court. The
district court denied the motion to dismiss,
holding that the change in the law had not
deprived it of jurisdiction. The defendants
appealed to this Court, and we affirmed the
district court's exercise of jurisdiction, and
held that the former law governed the
pending dispute on the ground that the
Legislature had not intended to disrupt the
appeal proceedings then in process in the
courts and thereby leave some employees
with no right of judicial review.

The State contends that Archer v. Utah
State Land Board, 15 Utah 2d 321, 392 P.2d
622 (1964), is squarely on point and controls
this case. In Archer the Court held that
once jurisdiction of the district court had
[3,4] In the instant case, the statute
attached in a proceeding for review of an
providing the Department with a right to
administrative order, an amendment projudicial review of a Step 5 determination
viding for additional administrative proceedings prior to judicial- review did not was repealed prior to the completion of
divest the court of jurisdiction. The origi- Step 5 procedures. The complaint filed in
nal law continued to govern and the amend- the district court did not validly invoke the
ment had no effect. In Archer the Court jurisdiction of the district court because
did not distinguish between substantive law there was no then existing statute authorizchanges and procedural law changes. In ing the exercise of such jurisdiction.
any event, a vital factual distinction exists Therefore, Archer and Agee are not disposibetween ArcAer and the present case. Al- tive. The statute in effect when the State
though we stated in Archer "that ordinarily filed its complaint in the district court rethe facts and the law in a given lawsuit are quired defendants to complete ail available
to be applied as of the date of the filing of administrative procedures prior to filing a
the original complaint," 15 Utah 2d at 324, petition for judicial review in the district
392 P.2d at 624, the effective date of the court, and this the State failed to do. It is
amendment in that case was after the filing elementary that administrative remedies,
of the complaint in the district court. In except in rare instances, must first be exthe instant case, the law providing for judi- hausted before resort may be had to judicial
cial review after Step 5 was repealed prior review. Johnson v. Utah State Retirement
Bd., Utah, 621 P.2d 1234 (1980); Am.Jur.2d,
to the filing of the complaint.
Administrative
Law § 595 (1962). Thus,
Industrial Commission v. Agcc, 56 Utah
under
the
law
in
effect at the time of filing
63, 189 P. 414 (1920), also held that once a
the
complaint,
the
Personnel Management
reviewing court's jurisdiction had attached
Act,
the
district
court
correctly held that
in a case, an act repealing the jurisdiction
the
administrative
procedures
had not been
of the court in question was not intended to
exhausted
and
properly
dismissed
the comdivest that court of jurisdiction. In Agce
an appeal was taken to the district court for plaint.
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The additional administrative proceedings
provided for by the Personnel Management
Act, § 67-19-1 et seq., must be completed
in accordance with the terms of that act
before any right of judicial review accrues.
As stated in Boucofski v. Jacobsen, 36 Utah
165, 104 P. 117 (1909):
While it is true that a party's rights in a
judgment, as a general rule, may not be
affected by legislative acts passed or
which become effective after the entry of
judgment, the rule does not apply to laws
which are merely remedial, and which
only affect matters of procedure or practice . . . . [T]he amendment related to a
matter of procedure merely, and this
would apply to all pending actions unless
limited to future actions. In 1 Lewis'
Suth. Stat. Const. § 674, the author says:
"Where a new statute deals with procedure only, prima facie, it applies to all
actions—those which have accrued or are
pending, and to future actions." Further
on in the same section it is said: "A
remedy may be provided for existing
rights, a new remedy added to or substituted for those which exist. Every case
must, to a considerable extent, depend on
its own circumstances. General words in
remedial statutes may be applied to past
transactions and pending cases, according
to all indications of legislative intent, and
this may be greatly influenced by considerations of convenience, reasonableness
and justice." In section 686 of the same
volume it is said: "Statutes enacted to
promote and facilitate the administration
of justice are prominent in the category
of remedial statutes." Section 3490,
Comp.Laws 1907, provides: uAn action is
deemed to be pending from the time of
its commencement until its final determination upon appeal, or until the time for
appeal has passed, unless the judgment is
sooner satisfied."
Id. at 171-72, 104 P. at 119-20. See also
United States v. National City Lines, 80
F.Supp. 734 (S.D.Cal.1948); Tennessee River Nav. Co. v. Grantland, 199 Ala. 674, 75
So. 283 (1917); Boyda Dairy Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 299 Ill.App. 469, 20
N.E.2d 339 (1939).

Section 67-19-25 of the Personnel Management Act now provides that both a state
agency and an aggrieved employee may
take a Step 6 appeal to the personnel review board from an adverse decision at
Step 5. The agency's right of judicial review under the old Grievance Procedure
Act and under the Personnel Management
Act prior to its amendment, however, is
abolished.
[5] Finally, we note the State's contention that the parties had stipulated prior to
the Step 5 proceeding that the Grievance
Procedure Act would govern the proceedings in this case. The stipulation, however,
is not effective to confer jurisdiction on a
court. Parties may not by stipulation enlarge the jurisdiction of a court beyond the
boundaries delimited by statutory or constitutional law. Landes & Co. v. Fellows, 81
Utah 432, 19 P.2d 389 (1933); Winn v.
Winn, Mont., 651 P.2d 51 (1982); Sholty v.
Carruih, 126 Ariz. 458, 616 P.2d 918 (1980).
[6] On remand of this case, the Personnel Management Act will control the administrative proceeding since it does not
affect any common law or vested rights,
and since jurisdiction of the district court
had not yet attached at the time the Employees' Grievance Procedure Act was repealed. Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 90 S.Ct
200, 24 L.Ed.2d 214 (1969); Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268, 89 S.Ct. 518, 21
L.Ed.2d 474 (1969); Carpenter v. Wabash
Railway Co., 309 U.S. 23, 60 S.Ct. 416, 84
L.Ed. 558 (1940); Concerned Parents v.
Mitchell, Utah, 645 P.2d 629 (1982).
[7] Because of the unusual procedural
complications in this case, we think it appropriate that the Department of Social
Services be accorded on remand the right of
filing for a Step 6 proceeding, and the order
of the district court remanding this case
should be amended to so provide.
Affirmed as modified.
HALL, C.J., and OAKS, HOWE and
DURHAM, JJ., concur.
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. 3. Statutes <3=>267(2)
Statutes which operate in furtherance
of a remedy already existing and which
neither create new rights nor destroy existing rights are applied retrospectively to
accrued or pending actions to further legislature's remedial purpose unless a contrary
legislative intent is manifested.
4. Statutes <s=>265, 267(2)
Statutes enacted subsequent to initiNo. 20141.
ation of a suit which do not enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or contractual
Supreme Court of Utah.
rights apply not only to future actions, but
Aug. 7, 1985.
also to accrued and pending actions as well.
5. Workers' Compensation <s=>63
Statute providing for interest payPlaintiff, who was injured in an indusments
on past-due workers' compensation
trial accident in an underground coal mine,
benefits
applied to action seeking benefits
filed a claim for permanent.partial disabilifor
injury
sustained before passage of the
ty benefits. The administrative law judge
statute.
U.C.A.
1953, 35-1-78.
denied plaintiffs request and the Industrial
Commission affirmed, and plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court, 681 P.2d 208,
Virginius Dabney, Salt Lake City, for
reversed and remanded. On remand, the plaintiff.
administrative law judge entered an order
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Salt Lake
awarding plaintiff permanent total disabiliCity, for Industrial Com'n.
ty benefits. Plaintiff then made a motion
James R. Black, Salt Lake City, for State
for reconsideration requesting inclusion of
Ins.
Fund.
interest on the award for past-due benefits.
Gilbert A. Martinez, Salt Lake City, for
The administrative law judge denied the
motion, and plaintiff appealed. The Su- Second Injury Fund.
preme Court, Hall, C.J., held that statute
HALL, Chief Justice:
providing for interest payments on pastdue workers' compensation benefits applied
Plaintiff appeals a decision of the Industo action seeking benefits for injury sus- trial Commission denying him interest on
tained before passage of the statute.
past due benefits. Interest was denied on
the ground that plaintiff's injury occurred
Reversed.
before passage of the statute providing for
Stewart, J., concurred in the result interest payments. U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-

Nolan W. MARSHALL, Plaintiff,
v.
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF the
STATE OF UTAH, Emery Mining Corporation (Employer), and/or the State
Insurance Fund of the State of Utah,
and the Second Injury Fund of the
State of Utah, Defendants.

1. Workers' Compensation <3=»60
In worker's compensation cases benefits to be awarded to an injured worker are
to be determined on basis of the suit as it
existed at time of the injury.
2. Statutes <$=»265, 266
A later statute or amendment should
not be applied in a retroactive manner to
deprive a party of his rights or impose
greater liability upon him.

78 (Supp.1983). We reverse.
On January 25, 1980, plaintiff was injured in an industrial accident in an underground coal mine. He was paid temporary
total disability benefits from March 1,1980,
to November 14, 1980. On July 1, 1981,
plaintiff filed a claim for permanent partial
disability benefits and an application for
hearing with the Industrial Commission. A
hearing was held on July 12, 1982. On
February 4, 1983, the administrative law
judge (ALJ) denied plaintiffs request for a
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finding of entitlement to permanent total law as it.existed at the time of the injury.4
disability benefits. The Industrial Commis- As the Court said in Okland Construction
sion affirmed the ALJ's order. Plaintiff Co. v. Industrial Commission:* "[A] later
then appealed to this Court. The Court statute or amendment should not be apreversed, finding that plaintiff was entitled plied in a retroactive manner to deprive a
to permanent disability benefits.1 On re- party of his rights or impose greater liabilimand, the ALI entered an order awarding ty upon him."
plaintiff permanent total disability benefits.
We recognize that this rule differs from
Plaintiff then made a motion for recon- the general rule followed in this jurisdicsideration requesting the ALI to include tion which is that "the substantive law to
interest of 8% per annum on the award for be applied throughout an action is the law
past due benefits. The ALI denied the in effect at the date the action was initimotion, reasoning that since the interest ated*." (Emphasis added.)6
provision was added to the statute effective
[3,4] A contrary rule to both of the
May 12, 1981,2 and plaintiffs injury occurred in 1980, the law in effect at the time above applies, however, to statutes which
of the injury governed the case. The ALI operate in furtherance of a remedy already
relied on the following language from Kin- existing and which neither create new
cheloe v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co..-3 "Inas- rights nor destroy existing rights. Those
much as the incident here concerned oc- remedial statutes are applied retrospectivecurred in 1980, we are bound to apply the ly to accrued or pending actions to further
law as of that date.",
the legislature's remedial purpose unless a
U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-78 (Supp.1983) pro- contrary legislative intent is manifested.*
vides in pertinent part: "Awards made by As the Court said in State v. Higgs:*
[S]tatutes enacted subsequent to the inithe industrial commission shall include intiation of a suit which do not enlarge,
terest at the rate of 8% per annum from
eliminate, or destroy vested or contractuthe date when each benefit payment would
al rights apply not only to future actions,
have otherwise become due and payable."
but
also to accrued and pending actions
Plaintiff argues that the statutory wordas
well.
ing is unambiguous:. inclusion of 8% interest must be made on awards from the date (Emphasis added.) By implication, such
when the payment was due regardless of statutes enacted before the initiation of a
when the injury occurred.
suit or claim automatically apply to suits or
[1,2] This Court has consistently held claims initiated subsequent to passage of a
that in worker's compensation cases the procedural or remedial statute.
benefits to be awarded to an injured work[5] The purpose of the worker's comer are to be determined on the basis of the pensation act is "to secure workmen ...
1. Marshall v. Industrial Comm'rt, Utah, 681 P.2d 5. Suprat note 4 at 210.
208 (1984).
6. Department of Social Servs. v. Higgs, Utah, 656
2. The amendment to the statute was passed in
P.2d 998, 1000 (1982). See also Archer v. Utah
the legislative session which adjourned on
State Land Bd., 15 Utah 2d 321, 324, 392 P.2d
March 12. 1981, with no specific effective date.
622, 624 (1964) ("[OJrdinarily the facts and the
Therefore, the statute became effective sixty
law in a given lawsuit are to be applied as of the
days after the adjournment. Utah Const, art.
date of the filing of the original complaint.").
VI, § 25.
7. Pilcher v. Department of Social Servs., Utah,
663 P.2d 450, 455 (1983); Foil v. Ballinger, Utah,
601
P.2d 144, 151 (1979). See also Selk v. De4. Smith v. Industrial Comm'n, Utah, 549 P.2d
troit Plastic Prod., 419 Mich. 1, 10, 345 N.W.2d
448, 449 (1976); Utah Constr. Co. v. Matheson,
184, 188(1984).
,
Utah, 534 P.2d 1238, 1239 (1975); Okland
Constr. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, Utah, 520 P.2d
8. Supra note 6.
208, 210 (1974).
3. Utah, 656 P.2d 440, 442 n.5 (1982).
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MARSHALL v. INDUSTRIAL COM'N OF STATE OP UTAH Utah
against becoming objects of charity, by
making reasonable compensation for calamities incidental to the employment
"9 This payment is intended to compensate the injured individual for the loss
of employability resulting from the injury
and is keyed to a percentage of the worker's average weekly wages.10 Thus, it is
clear that compensation for worker disability is legislation for the public welfare. It
is also clear that the statute providing for
interest on unpaid benefits was a legislative attempt to remedy a serious social
problem: the depreciation of the value of
benefits as a result of non-receipt of the
weekly benefit for months, or perhaps
years, until a final determination of eligibility and an award are made.11 To effect
this purpose, the legislature could only
have intended this remedy to apply to as
broad a range of awards as possible.
The ALJ in this case apparently assumed
that payment of interest on a worker's
compensation award was analagous to a
new benefit since, in denying interest on
the instant award, the ALJ relied on a
footnote in Kincheloe n which noted that
the law in effect at the time of the injury
governed.
In Kincheloe, the Court was considering
whether the Second Injury Fund was liable
to the plaintiff there for benefits under
U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-69. Since, as noted
previously, the benefits to be awarded to
9. Marshaii, supra note 1 681 P.2d at 210-11
(quoting Henrie v. Rocky Mountain Packing
Corp., 113 Utah 415, 427, 196 P.2d 487, 493
(1948)).

•••

Ks comnen ...

10. Marshall, supra note 1, 681 P.2d at 211.
Jtah, 656
r v. Utah
392 P.2d
and the
asof the
plaint.').
*,; Utah,
ert Utah.
&"tt DeHXUd

.j4~*rt'

11. Selk, 419 Mich, at 12, 345 N.W.2d, at 189.
12. Supra, note 3.

t.:

i
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13. "[T]he [interest] rate applied is usually the
rate in effect at the time interest is assessed,
rather than the rate in effect at the time of
injury." 3 Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 83.42(a) at 15-764 (1983) (footnotes
omitted).
14. Selk, supra note 7. Cf. Myers v. Carr Constr.
Co., Fla.App., 387 So.2d 417 (1980); Jeannette
Foods, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal
Bd., 39 Pa.Commw. 107, 394 A.2d 1309 (1978).

an injured worker must be determined on
the basis of the law as it existed at the time
of the injury, the Court noted that it was
bound to apply the law as of that date,
even though the legislature had amended
the law subsequent to Kincheloe's injury.
Thus, the issue involved in Kincheloe concerned substantive law.
This line of case law is inapposite to
interest payments on worker's compensation awards.13 Interest on a compensation
award is incident to a right and a remedy
that already exists.14 Retroactive application of the statute does not alter the substance of the compensation award.15 Payment of interest on an unpaid benefit neither creates a new right nor destroys an
existing right Therefore, interest payments should be" made on any benefits
awarded after the effective date of the
statute even though the injury had occurred before. According to the terms of
the statute, interest must be paid on each
benefit payment which comprises the
award from the date that payment would
have been due and payable.16
The decision of the Industrial Commission is reversed.
HOWE, DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN,
JJ., concur.
STEWART, J., concurs in the result
15. Selk, 419 Mich, at 12, 345 N.W.2d at 189. See
also First Natl Bank v. Paul Hughes Trucking
Co., Okla.App„ 645 P.2d 1054 (1982) (interest is
not a benefit but a charge assessed for use of the
claimant's money pending appeal). Cf. Ballog v.
Knight Newspapers, Inc., 381 Mich. 527, 535, 164
*N.W.2d 19, 22 (1969) (interest is incident to a
right that already exists and is analogous to the
costs and court fees of an action).
16. We note that in cases not involving worker's
compensation awards (eg. prejudgment interest) case law is split as to whether a statute
increasing the interest rate requires payment of
the new interest rate from the date of injury or
from the effective date of the amendatory act.
See e.g„ AnnoL, 4 ALR 2d 932 (1949); Annot., 4
ALR 2d 932, Later Case Service (1985).

&&irv
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888 Utah

would not eliminate the gap but only shift
its impact Under plaintiffs' proposed construction, we would prevent a referendum
from being aborted due to official neglect
but do so at the risk of permitting legislation to be aborted due to unofficial manipulation. Until instructed otherwise by the
Legislature, we prefer to construe this gap
so as to eliminate the risk of improper
manipulation of the referendum petition by
private persons and to assume what we
deem the lesser risk of improper conduct by
duly elected officials.4
The summary judgment for defendant is
affirmed. No costs awarded.
MAUGHAN, C. J., and HALL, STEWART and HOWE, JJ., concur.
( o I KqMMBERSYsTJM^

KAISER STEEL CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,
v.
Lawrence F. MONFREDI and The
Industrial Commission of Utah,
Defendants.

the question is not whether the court agrees
with the Commission's findings or whether
they are supported by the preponderance of
evidence but whether the findings are
"arbitrary or capricious," or "wholly without
cause" or contrary to the "one inevitable
conclusion from the evidence" or without
"any substantial evidence" to support them;
only then should the findings be displaced.
2. Workers' Compensation <3=» 1716
Meaning of "accident" for workmen's
compensation purposes is question of law;
whether evidence conforms to that meaning
is question of fact. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
3. Workers' Compensation $=>1533, 1653
Industrial Commission's finding that
employee's back injury and temporary total
disability resulted from "accident" was not
arbitrary or capricious, wholly without
cause, or without any substantial evidence
to support it. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.

1. Workers'Compensation «=> 1939.4(4)
The Supreme Court's function in reviewing findings of fact of Industrial
Commission is a strictly limited one in which

Steven E. Clyde, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff.
David L. Wilkinson, Salt Lake City, Marlynn B. Lema, Priee, for defendants.
OAKS, Justice:
This is a writ of review to set aside an
order of the Industrial Commission in a
claim for workmen's compensation. The order directed the employer to pay $2,532,94
plus medical expenses to an employee who
was totally disabled for three months with
a back injury. The employer seeks reversal
of that order.
The administrative law judge, whose
findings and conclusions were affirmed by
the Industrial Commission, found (1) that
"there was a definite identifiable injury to
the Applicant's low back on January 5,
1979"; (2) that "the Applicant was temporarily totally disabled" from that date until
April 4, 1979; and (3) that "Applicant is
entitled to workmen's compensation benefits as a result of his industrial accident of
January 5, 1979 . . . . " ! The employer ar-

4. We express no opinion on whether the mandamus remedy currently available under U.R.
C.P., Rule 65B(b)(3) or any other remedy would
be available to compel action by a clerk who
declined to perform his or her statutory func-

tion in time for the proponents of a petition to
meet the deadline under § 20-11-24.
I. The administrative law judge also found that
applicant had a 15 percent permanent physicaJ
impairment "based on moderaterigidityof the

No. 17152.
Supreme Court of Utah.
June 1, 1981.
Employer sought review of an order of
the Industrial Commission awarding an employee benefits for temporary total disability on account of a back injury. The Supreme Court, Oaks, J., held that the Commissioner's finding that the employee's injury and disability resulted from an "accident" was not arbitrary or capricious, wholly without cause, or without any substantial
evidence to support it.
Affirmed.

%
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gues that the applicant's disability resulted
from a preexisting physical condition rather
than an identifiable "accident . . . in the
course of his employment" as required by
U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45.2 The issue on appeal—whether the applicant was injured by
an "accident"—is a question of fact which
turns on the findings of the Commission
and the evidence before it.
The governing statutes (1) require the
Commission to make written findings of
fact, and (2) provide that the "findings and
conclusions of the commission on questions
of fact shall be conclusive and final and
shall not be subject to review," § 35-1-85,
except where "the findings of fact do not
support the award." § 35-1-84(2). The
meaning of that exception was defined in
the leading case of Kavalinakis v. Indus.
Comm'n, 67 Utah 174, 181-82, 184, 246 P.
698, 700, 701 (1926), as follows:
What we hold is that in case . . . we are
asked to overturn the findings and conclusions of the commission which appear
to be in conflict with or contrary to the
evidence, it must be clearly made to appear to us that the commission acted arbitrarily or capriciously and wholly without
cause in rejecting or in refusing to give
effect to the evidence.... Any other
conclusion would make this court merely
a reviewing court with power to weigh
the probative effect of the evidence....
lumbar spine accompanied by associated progressive degenerative disease of the lumbar
spine'* due to accidental injury, disease or congenital causes existing prior to the January 5,
1979, injury.

Unless therefore it can be said, upon the
whole record, that the commission clearly
acted arbitrarily or capriciously in making its findings and decision, this court is
powerless to interfere. Such is the manifest purpose and intent of the Workmen's
Compensation Act. . . . It was not intended, . .. that this Court, in matters of
evidence, should to any extent substitute
its judgment for the judgment of the
commission.
The Kavalinakis declaration that the Commission will be sustained in its findings of
fact unless its action was "arbitrary or capricious" has been cited repeatedly as the
appropriate standard by which this Court
reviews the Commission's findings of fact.3
In many subsequent cases, this Court has
also reaffirmed that the reviewing court
does not weigh the probative "effect of conflicting evidence before the Commission.4
Similarly, the reviewing court will survey
the evidence in the light most favorable to
the Commission's findings and order.5 Subsequent courts have also reaffirmed the Kavalinakis statement that under the Workmen's Compensation Act this Court should
not "to any extent substitute the judgment
of the court upon factual matters for the
judgment of the commission."6 Thus, for
example, this Court has repeatedly held
that it cannot substitute its judgment for
the Commission's on which of two possible
261, 153 P.2d 272 (1944); Kelly v. Indus.
Comm'n, 80 Utah 73, 12 P.2d 1112 (1932).
4.

E. g., Wiseman v. Village Partners, Utah, 589
P.2d 754 (1978); dinger v. Indus. Comm'n,
Utah, 571 P.2d 1328 (1977); Russell v. Indus.
Comm'n, 86 Utah 306, 43 P.2d 1069 (1935);
Ogden Union Ry. v. Indus. Comm'n, 85 Utah
124, 38 P.2d 766 (1934); Parker v. Indus.
Comm'n, 78 Utah 509, 5 P.2d 573 (1931).

5.

E. g., Chadwick v. Indus. Comm'n, Utah, 572
P.2d 400, 402 (1977); Savage v. Indus.
Comm'n, Utah, 565 P.2d 782, 783 (1977); Shipley v. C. & W Contracting Co., Utah, 528 P.2d
153, 155 (1974), and cases cited therein.

6.

E. g.. Kent v. Indus. Comm'n, 89 Utah 381;
386, 57 P.2d 724 (1936).

2. "Every employee . .. who is injured . . . by
accident arising out of or in the course of his
employment . .. shall be entitled to [compensation and medical expenses}." U.C.A., 1953,
§ 35-1-45.
3. E. g., McPhie v. Indus. Comm'n, Utah, 567
P26 153 (1977); McWilliams
v. Indus.
Comm'n, 21 Utah 2d 266, 444 P.2d 513 (1968);
Garner v. Hecla Mining Company, 19 Utah 2d
367, 431 P.2d 794 (1967); Baker v. Indus.
Comm'n, 17 Utah 2d 141, 405 P.2d 613 (1965);
Western Contracting Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n,
15 Utah 2d 208, 390 P.2d 125 (1964); Dalton v.
Indus. Comm'n, 8 Utah 2d 353, 334 P.2d 763
(1959); Lorange v. Indus. Comm'n, 107 Utah
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inferences should be drawn from the evidence.7
There are at least two other much-cited
descriptions of this Court's scope of review
of Commission findings of fact. In Kent v.
Indus. Comm'n, 89 Utah 381, 385, 57 P.2d
724, 725 (1936), a unanimous Court declared:
In case of an award of compensation,
all the record is required to disclose is
* that there is sufficient, competent, material evidence in the record to support the
award. That there is a conflict in the
evidence, or that this court might or
would have found differently had the evidence been submitted to it as a trier of
the facts, is of no consequence. The Industrial Commission is a fact-finding
body, and in case there is any substantial
evidence to support its findings, its findings are conclusive upon this court and
may not be disturbed.
In Noma v. Indus. Comm'n, 90 Utah 256,
260-61, 61 P.2d 413, 415 (1936), the Court
defined its function as follows:
Where the matter presented on appeal
is the question of whether the commission
should have in law arrived at a conclusion
of fact different from that at which it did
arrive from the evidence, a question of
law is presented only when it is claimed
that the commission could only arrive at
% one conclusion from the evidence, and
that it found contrary to that inevitable
conclusion.
Writing for the Court, Justice Wolfe outlined six criteria which had to combine in
order to justify reversing the Commission,
such as uncontradicted evidence in opposition to its position, and then continued:
If the commission should decide against
the uncontradicted evidence under those
conditions, its decision would as a matter
of law be arbitrary and capricious, which
is another way of saying that it would be
unreasonable.
[1] Under any of these standards— Kavalinakis, Kent, or Norris—it is apparent that
7, Pace v. Indus. Comm'n, 87 Utah 6, 47 P.2d
1050 (1935); Park Utah Consoi Mines Co. v.
Indus. Comm'n, 84 Utah 481, 36 P.2d 979

this Court's function in reviewing Commission findings of fact is a strictly limited one
in which the question is not whether the
Court agrees with the Commission's findings or whether they are supported by the
preponderance of evidence. Instead, the reviewing court's inquiry is whether the Com- ~
mission's findings are "arbitrary or capricious," or "wholly without cause" or contrary to the "one [inevitable] conclusion
from the evidence" or without "any substantial evidence" to support them0 Only
then should the Commission's findings be
displaced.
[2] Applying those standards, we turn
to the record to see whether there is the
requisite support for the Commission's finding that the applicant sustained a "definite
identifiable injury" (or "accident"—the
terms are used interchangeably in the findings—) on the job on January 5, 1979. This
requires a preliminary inquiry into the
meaning of the word accident in § 35-1-45.
The meaning of this word is a question of
law; whether the evidence conforms to that
meaning is a question of fact.
The leading case on the meaning of "accident" is Carling v. Industrial Commission,
16 Utah 2d 260, 261-62, 399 P.2d 202, 203
(1965), a unanimous opinion in which this
Court declared:
[T]his court has held that for the purpose
of the Act [the term "accident"] should
be given a broad meaning. It connotes
an unanticipated, unintended occurrence
different from what would normally be
expected to occur in the usual course of
events. We recognize the correctness of
plaintiffs contention that even though
there must be some such "accident" within the meaning of that statute, this is not
necessarily restricted to some single incident which happened suddenly at one
particular time and does not preclude the
possibility that due to exertion, stress or
other repetitive cause, a climax might be
reached in such manner as to properly
(1934); Parker v. Indus. Comm'n, 78 Utah 509,
5 P.2d 573 (1931); and cases'cited therein.
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fall within the definition of an accident
as just stated above. However, such an
occurrence must be distinguished from
gradually developing conditions which are
classified as occupational diseases and
which are not compensable except as provided in [§ 35-2-1, et seq.].
This Court has held that the aggravation of
a preexisting disability of the back by the
performance of an employee's usual and
customary work is not compensable as an
"accident" where there was no "intervention of any unusual event or trauma." 8 On
the other hand, this Court has also applied
the Carling definition by declaring that
even though a back injury is related to a
preexisting deficiency or disease, "if there
is an incident, properly regarded as an accident in the course of work which adds to or
aggravates that condition, any resulting injury is compensable."9
As suggested by the contrast between
those two cases, the application of the "accident" requirement to back injuries has been
particularly vexing to this Court and to the
Commission. In fact, this is at least the
ninth back injury case that has come to this
Court from the Commission in less than 30
months,10 and in most of these cases the
Court has been sharply divided, often on
whether or not the disability was the result
of an "accident" or merely the consequence
of a preexisting condition. *
The facts of one of these back cases, U.S.
Steel Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, Utah, 607
P.2d 807 (1980), are remarkably similar to
the facts in the case now before the Court.
In U.S. Steely the employee "felt a pop in
his back" as he was reaching under a conveyor belt in the course of shoveling ore
from under the belt. His injury was diagnosed as a herniated disk. The Commission
found that the employee's temporary dis8. Farmers Grain Co-op v. Mason, Utah, 606
P.2d 237, 239 (1980).
9. United States Steel Corp. v. Draper, Utah,
613 P.2d 508, 509 (1980). Accord, Nuzum v.
Roosendahl Const & Min. Corp., Utah, 565
P.2d 1144, 1146(1977).
10. Entwhistle v. Indus. Comm'n, Utah, 626 P.2d
495 (1981); Painter Motor Co. v. Ostler, Utah,

ability had resulted from an industrial accident, and this Court unanimously affirmed
an award for temporary total disability.
[3] The record evidence in this case
showed that at the start of his shift in the
mine on January 5, 1979, the applicant,
Monfredi, was scaling rock from the roof of
the mine and shoveling it onto a conveyor
belt. In the hearing before the Commission, he was questioned about whether
there was any particular or unusual incident or act that he could specify as causing
his injury, such as breaking a shovel or
slipping on a rock. He gave this answer:
No. I was just shoveling onto the belt.
Shoveling that rock. I was scaling down
the rock by the beltline, and I was shoveling it onto the belt. Cleaning it up. . . .
Well, I was right by the belt. You know.
I got my shovel, and was scaling down
some rock. Then, when I went to shovel
like this, there was a catch in my back.
Right here in the lower back. (Indicating) . . .
It went about halfway. If it had went
out entirely, they would have had to
carry me out. But it was just half out.
The company doctor who examined the applicant reported "Lumbar Syndrome . . .
general spinal arthritis and possible discogenic disease," predicting a one-week return to work. When the lower back pain
prevented the applicant's return in that period, he was examined by a specialist and
hospitalized for about a week. A myelogram was performed "with findings of shallow but consistent extradural defect at the
L4-5 interspace level consistent with disk
protrusion without other demonstrated abnormality." The final discharge diagnosis
was "herniated lumbar disk."
617 P.2d 975 (1980); Schmidt v. Indus.
Comm'n, Utah. 617 P.2d 693 (1980); U.S. Steel
v. Indus. Comm'n, Utah, 607 P.2d 807 (1980);
Farmer's Grain Co-op v. Mason, Utah, 606 P.2d
237 (1980); Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints v. Indus. Comm'n, Utah, 590 P.2d
328 (1979); Wiseman v. Village Partners, Utah,
589 P.2d 754 (1978); Buxton v. Indus. Comm'n,
Utah. 587 P.2d 121 (1978).
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The applicant had worked as a miner for conclude that the Commission's finding that
this employer for about 27 years. Until applicant's injury and disability resulted
1978, he had been a roof bolter. He had a from an "accident" was "arbitrary or caprihistory of back problems associated with his cious" or "wholly without cause" or without
work. In 1965, he was examined by the "any substantial evidence" to support it
company doctor for pain in the lumber re- The Commission's order is therefore afgion after lifting a duke. In 1968, he was firmed.
examined twice, once after feeling a pinch
in his lower back as he was lifting a big
MAUGHAN, C. J., and HALL, STEWrock from under the conveyor belt, and once
ART and HOWE, JJ., concur.
for lower back pain after he grabbed for a
rock on the conveyor belt. Company medical reports also showed that in 1969 he
rw
twisted his back as he was shoveling rock
(o 6 KEY NUM8ER SYSTEM} '
along the face of the coal seam, in 1970 he
sustained a strain to his lower back as he
was pulling a grease bucket from under a
conveyor belt, and in 1971 he felt a pinch in
his lower back while he was lifting a sack of
rock dust. Again that same year, he inCheater V. BUTTARS, Plaintiff
jured his back (which "went out" as he
and Appellant,
described it) while lifting steel beams. According to the applicant's statement, all of
these injuries were covered by workmen's
Asael M. BUTTARS, Defendant
compensation.
and Respondent.
The applicant's history of work-related
No. 17136.
accidents and his medical condition showed
a job-induced preexisting condition which
Supreme Court of Utah.
could have been added to or aggravated,
June 2, 1981.
United States Steel Corp. v. Draper, Utah,
613 P.2d 508, 509 (1980), by the work-related incident that occurred on January 5,
1979, or which could have reached what this
In an action to quiet title, the First
Court has referred to as a "climax" due to District Court, Cache County, VeNoy Chris"exertion, stress, or other repetitive cause toffersen, J., found for defendant. On ap. . . in such manner as to properly fall peal by the plaintiff, the Supreme Court,
within the definition of an accident . . .," Oaks, J., held that where son held land in
Carling v. Indus. Comm'n, quoted supra. In fee simple determinable, with his estate to
the almost identical circumstance in U.S. terminate by special limitation if he should
Steel Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, supra,—a pop fail to pay and perform his $500 per year
in the back suffered while reaching to shov- obligation to his mother, and he admittedly
el under a conveyor belt—this Court unani- paid only seven of 14 annual payments,
mously affirmed an award for temporary district court, citing "special relationship"
total disability.
existing between son and his mother and
Mindful of the "recognized rule of con- fact that he performed many personal and
struction [that] resolves any doubt respect- business services for her each year could
ing the right of compensation in favor of find for son on basis of waiver and satisfaethe injured employee or his dependents," tion and could therefore find that son's
and the principle that "the compensation estate did not terminate.
statutes should be liberally construed in faAffirmed.
vor of recovery," McPhie v. Indus. Comm 'n,
Utah, 567 P.2d 153, 155 (1977), we cannot
Stewart, J., concurred in result.
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